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President Donald Trump’s major success has been confirming
judges for the thirteen federal appellate courts. The President shattered
records by appointing a dozen circuit jurists in his administration’s
first year, eighteen judges over the course of 2018, and twenty additional judges throughout his third year. Indeed, by June 2019, the appeals courts experienced four vacancies in 179 judgeships and today,
only one position remains empty. This achievement is critical, as these
tribunals are the courts of last resort for nearly every appeal, and ap-
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pellate court opinions articulate greater policy than district court rulings and cover multiple states.
However, that accomplishment does entail costs. In the haste of
President Trump to quickly nominate, and the Republican Senate majority to expeditiously confirm, many able, ideologically conservative,
young appeals court jurists, the President and the Senate neglect myriad open posts in the district courts. The district courts now realize
seventy-three vacancies in 677 positions, forty-five of which are considered “judicial emergencies” due to remaining protracted and immense filings. District court jurists are the federal justice system’s
“workhorses” and resolve most litigation, and the numerous openings
place substantial pressures on the district courts. Thus, the judicial selection process under President Trump requires analysis.
The first section of this article canvasses the origin and evolution
of the problem described, showing that it constitutes permanent and
modern concerns, the latter of which needs emphasis. The second section scrutinizes the judicial appointment procedures implemented by
President Trump and the Republican Senate majority. This section detects that the President stresses rapid appointment of young, conservative appeals court judges but downplays filling trial-level vacancies.
The White House also eschews venerable judicial selection conventions—including the vigorous consultation of senators from jurisdictions with openings and comprehensive American Bar Association
(ABA) candidate evaluations and ratings—upon which contemporary
Presidents have relied. The section then assesses the confirmation process, ascertaining that since the Trump Administration’s outset, the
Judiciary Committee has deemphasized various longstanding customs,
especially the “blue slip” policy (which stops nominee processing unless in-state politicians approve choices) and the careful arrangement
of hearings, which earlier committees had steadfastly applied. The
Grand Old Party (GOP) Senate majority leadership similarly, albeit
less frequently, violates traditions regarding floor debates.
The third section of this article reviews the particular consequences imposed by salient non-traditional White House and Senate
practices, finding that a significantly greater number of district court
vacancies existed throughout most of the Trump presidency than at the
time of his inauguration. Concerted emphasis on the rapid appointment of conservative appeals court members and stark departures from
long-standing selection precedents have apparently undercut presidential discharge of the constitutional responsibilities to nominate and
confirm excellent jurists and the constitutional senatorial duty to furnish advice and consent. Moreover, the prolonged nature and substan-
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tial quantity of district court openings seemingly undermine the
judiciary’s crucial responsibility for promptly, inexpensively and equitably deciding cases. The GOP’s stress on ideology and its unproductive partisanship can make jurists resemble the chief executive and
Congress and could politicize the judiciary, thus subverting public
confidence in the federal bench.
The fourth section proffers suggestions for the future. In the near
future, President Trump must assertively consult home state
lawmakers and once again rely upon ABA examinations and ratings
from which contemporary Presidents, senators, jurists as well as the
Democratic and Republican political parties have derived copious
benefits. The Senate should analogously revitalize constructive devices related to confirmations—principally blue slips and comprehensive, robust panel hearings and discussions, and rigorous upper
chamber debates. Over the long-term, Republicans and Democrats
should carefully address the “confirmation wars” through a comprehensive approach, which includes the creation of bipartisan courts, notably with the passage of judgeship legislation.
MODERN JUDICIAL

I.
SELECTION PROBLEMS

05/20/2020 13:21:22

1. The permanent vacancies complication merits less treatment than the contemporary difficulty, because considerable delay is inherent, defies felicitous solution and
has been analyzed elsewhere. See, e.g., Gordon Bermant et al., Judicial Vacancies:
An Examination of the Problem and Possible Solutions, 14 MISS. C. L. REV. 319
(1994); Remedying the Permanent Vacancy Problem in the Federal Judiciary – The
Problem of Judicial Vacancies and Its Causes, 42 REC. ASS’N B. CITY N.Y. 374
(1987).
2. The history of federal judicial selection deserves comparatively limited evaluation in this article, partly because numerous other commentators have analyzed the
relevant background. See, e.g., Bermant et al., supra note 1, at 320–21; Michael J.
Gerhardt & Michael Ashley Stein, The Politics of Early Justice, Federal Judicial
Selection, 1789-1861, 100 IOWA L. REV. 55 (2015); MILLER CENTER COMMISSION ON
THE SELECTION OF FEDERAL JUDGES, Improving the Process for Appointing Federal
Judges (1996) [hereinafter MILLER REPORT].
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One important aspect of the present complications that involve
selection has been the permanent vacancies difficulty, which results
from enlarged federal court jurisdiction, suits and judgeships.1 The
other crucial attribute, the contemporary dilemma, is essentially political and can be ascribed to contrasting White House and Senate political party control that started forty years ago, while the current
situation has greater pertinence and warrants somewhat more investigation in this piece.2

42218-nyl_22-2 Sheet No. 56 Side B

05/20/2020 13:21:22

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYL\22-2\NYL203.txt

424

unknown

Seq: 4

LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY

19-MAY-20

7:52

[Vol. 22:421

A. Persistent Vacancies
Lawmakers began expanding federal court jurisdiction in the
1960s and have continued to do so,3 establishing many civil causes of
action while federalizing additional criminal activity, parameters
which increase district court litigation and concomitant appeals.4 Congress addressed escalating caseloads by enlarging the number of judicial seats.5 From 1979 to 1992, appointments periods mounted.6 Prior
to 1980, court of appeals nominations demanded twelve months and
appellate confirmations required three months, and both later rose.7
Appellate court nomination periods subsequently consumed twenty
months and confirmations reached six between 1997, the initial year
of President Bill Clinton’s final term, and 2001, the opening year of
President George W. Bush’s first term.8
The convoluted stages and the many participants in the nomination and confirmation processes mean that some delay is inevitable.9
Presidents consult home state elected officials, pursuing advice on
submissions. Certain elected officials fashion and rely on merit selection panels that survey candidates while tendering prominent suggestions. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) does probing
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3. MILLER REPORT, supra note 2, at 3; see Carl Tobias, The New Certiorari and a
National Study of the Federal Appeals Courts, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1264, 1268–70
(1996).
4. E.g., Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-322, 108 Stat. 1796; Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101336, 104 Stat. 327.
5. 28 U.S.C. §§ 44, 133 (2012); see S.1385, 113th Cong. (2013); Judicial Vacancies, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies (last
updated Jan. 8, 2020).
6. The nomination process commences on the date that a judge assumes senior
status or retires and concludes when the President sends the Senate a nomination for
the vacancy. The confirmation process commences when the President sends the Senate the nomination and concludes when the Senate confirms the nominee. Bermant et
al., supra note 1, at 329–32. See generally JUDICIAL CONF. OF THE UNITED STATES,
LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 103 (1995).
7. The increase in time required for the president to nominate is not statistically
significant. However, the increase in time required for Senate confirmation is statistically significant. Bermant et al., supra note 1, at 323, 329–32 (asserting that 1970-92
appellate court vacancy rates were two times higher than previously). See generally
Thomas Sargentich, Report of the Task Force on Federal Judicial Selection of Citizens for Independent Courts, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 1031, 1032, 1044 (1999).
8. E.g., Sheldon Goldman, Judicial Confirmation Wars: Ideology and the Battle
for the Federal Courts, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 871, 904–08 (2005); Orrin G. Hatch, The
Constitution as the Playbook for Judicial Selection, 32 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y
1035 (2009). Both of these years resembled Obama’s first and final two years.
9. Bermant et al., supra note 1, at 322; Sheldon Goldman, Obama and the Federal
Judiciary: Great Expectations but Will He Have a Dickens of a Time Living Up to
Them?, 7 FORUM 1 (2009).
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“background checks.” The ABA examines and rates counsel.10 The
Department of Justice (DOJ) regularly helps screen individuals while
preparing nominees for Senate assessment. The Senate Judiciary Committee analyzes prospects, schedules candidate hearings, discusses
them and votes; nominees whom the committee reports might receive
chamber debates, when needed, preceding confirmation ballots.
B. The Contemporary Dilemma
Article II of the United States Constitution contemplates that senators may temper unwise presidential selection, while partisanship has
long suffused appointments.11 However, politicization first significantly expanded when President Richard Nixon consistently suggested
that he would deliver “law and order” by appointing “strict constructionists,”12 then profoundly increased after United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Judge Robert Bork’s
massive Supreme Court fight.13 Partisanship subsequently soared,
while divided government and the fervent hope that the political party
which lacked executive branch control might recapture it and confirm
jurists fostered delay.
Relatively slow nominations may explain the dearth of appointments. In early 1997 and 2001, President Clinton and President
George W. Bush respectively submitted relatively few appellate court
picks and the political party which did not enjoy White House control
criticized some of them.14 Lawmakers who proffered candidates also
stymied the pace.15 Bush’s minimal consultation of home state politi42218-nyl_22-2 Sheet No. 57 Side A
05/20/2020 13:21:22

10. MILLER REPORT, supra note 2; see ABA, STANDING COMM. ON FEDERAL JUDIWHAT IT IS AND HOW IT WORKS (1983).
11. THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, at 513 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed., 1961); see
MICHAEL GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL
AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 28 (2000); SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL
JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN 6 (1997).
12. GOLDMAN, supra note 11, at 207; DAVID O’BRIEN, JUDICIAL ROULETTE: REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY TASK FORCE ON JUDICIAL SELECTION 20 (1988).
13. E.g., MARK GITENSTEIN, MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF
AMERICA’S REJECTION OF ROBERT BORK’S NOMINATION TO THE SUPREME COURT
11–12 (1992); JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 18–19 (2007).
14. White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, President Clinton Nominates 22 to the
Federal Bench, Jan. 7, 1997; Remarks Announcing Nominations for the Federal Judiciary, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 724 (May 9, 2001).
15. Republican senators insisted on contributing input, and many even suggested
prospects. Neil A. Lewis, Clinton Has a Chance to Shape the Courts, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 9, 1997, at 30; see 143 CONG. REC. S2538-41 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997) (statement of Sen. Biden); infra note 36.
CIARY:
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cians further stalled nomination,16 and limited GOP processing of
Clinton aspirants might have prompted Democrats to slow the nomination and confirmation processes partly as payback for Republicans’
delayed processing of Clinton nominees.17 The Senate Judiciary Committee shared responsibility for the lack of appointments, because the
panel slowly assessed, convened hearings for, and voted on nominees;18 and over 1997 and 2001, few nominees captured appointment
due to Senate resource deficiencies conjoined with ideological resistance.19 Pressing Senate work on matters that were unrelated to judicial selection and the need for senators’ unanimous consent delayed
numerous chamber floor votes, allowing at least one senator to halt
confirmation ballots entirely.20
These phenomena have worsened over the course of recent administrations. During President Barack Obama’s tenure, GOP recalcitrance scaled new heights, a condition demonstrated by the
unprecedented refusal to process D.C. Circuit Chief Judge Merrick
Garland, Obama’s distinguished Supreme Court nominee.21 When
Republicans regained a Senate majority in 2015 and vowed to dutifully effectuate chamber “regular order” again, they confirmed merely
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16. David L. Greene & Thomas Healy, Bush Sends Judge List to Senate, BALT. SUN
(May 10, 2001), https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-2001-05-100105100112-story.html; see Elliot E. Slotnick, Appellate Judicial Selection During
the Bush Administration: Business as Usual or a Nuclear Winter?, 48 ARIZ. L. REV.
225, 234 (2006).
17. Paul A. Gigot, How Feinstein is Repaying Bush on Judges, WALL STREET J.
(May 9, 2001), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB989369905566856183; Neil A.
Lewis, Party Leaders Clash over Pace of Filing Judgeships, N.Y. TIMES, May 10,
2001, at A33.
18. Carl Tobias, Choosing Federal Judges in the Second Clinton Administration, 24
HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 741, 742 (1997) (finding that the panel convened one appellate court nominee hearing each month that the chamber was in session); Biden statement, supra note 15 (claiming that Democrats conducted two hearings each month
that the Senate was in session during 1987-94).
19. Tobias, supra note 18; Neil A. Lewis, Bush and Democrats in Senate Trade
Blame for Judge Shortage, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2002, at A9.
20. Jennifer Bendery, Republicans Still Find Ways to Stall Judicial Nominees Despite Filibuster Reform, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 10, 2014), https://www.huffington
post.com/2014/02/08/republicans-judicial-nominees_n_4748528.html?ncid=engmodu
shpmg00000006; infra notes 61, 110.
21. Robin Kar & Jason Mazzone, The Garland Affair: What History and the Constitution Really Say About President Obama’s Powers to Appoint a Replacement for
Justice Scalia, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 53 (2016); Ruth Marcus, Trump’s Dangerous Plot to Weaponize the Supreme Court, WASH. POST (Mar. 30, 2018), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trumps-dangerous-plot-to-weaponize-the-supre
me-court/2018/03/30/60b53a04-343d-11e8-94fa-32d48460b955_story.html; see generally, Carl Tobias, Confirming Supreme Court Justices in a Presidential Election
Year, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 1089 (2017).
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twenty Obama nominees, the fewest judges who have received appointment since Harry Truman was President, which left 103 appellate
court and district court slots open at President Trump’s inauguration.22
Given the GOP majority’s treatment of Obama picks, it was foreseeable that Democrats would engage in somewhat analogous delay—for
example, by mandating cloture votes and roll call ballots for virtually
all Trump nominees.
II.
JUDICIAL SELECTION

UNDER THE

TRUMP ADMINISTRATION

A. Nomination Process
Throughout the 2016 presidential campaign, then-candidate
Trump strongly promised to nominate and seat young, exceptionally
ideological conservatives. His administration delivered on this pledge
by confirming Supreme Court Justices Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh as well as many ideologically similar court of appeals and comparatively fewer ideologically extreme and young district court
nominees.23 President Trump established appellate court appointments
records during his first year with twelve confirmations, eighteen confirmations the next, and twenty confirmations across 2019, surpassing
modern predecessors’ appointments success.24
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22. Confirmation Listings, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/
judicial-vacancies/confirmation-listing (last updated Feb. 26, 2020); 163 CONG. REC.
S8022–24 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 2017) (statements of Sens. Feinstein, Leahy and Warren); see Carl Tobias, The Republican Senate and Regular Order, 101 IOWA L. REV.
ONLINE 12 (2016) (Republicans incessantly asserted that they were restoring regular
order, the system which putatively governed before the Democratic Senate majority
ostensibly eroded it, but the GOP majority did not restore regular order).
23. See Rorie Spill Solberg & Eric N. Waltenburg, Are Trump’s Judicial Nominees
Really Being Confirmed at a Record Pace? The Answer Is Complicated., WASH.
POST, (June 14, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/
2018/06/14/are-trumps-judicial-nominees-really-being-confirmed-at-a-record-pacethe-answer-is-complicated/; Judicial Confirmations for December 2019, U.S. CTS.,
https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/2019/12/confirmations (last updated Dec. 1, 2019); Judicial Confirmations for
December 2018, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/2018/12/confirmations (last updated Dec. 1, 2018);
Judicial Confirmations for December 2017, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/
judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/2017/12/confirma
tions (last updated Dec. 1, 2017) (supporting the fact that Trump is nominating relatively fewer district court judges than appellate court judges).
24. President John Kennedy confirmed eleven appellate court judges in his first
year. REP. OF THE S. JUDICIARY MINORITY MEMBERS, REVIEW OF REPUBLICAN EFFORTS TO STACK FEDERAL COURTS 14, (2018). George W. Bush appointed six circuit
jurists, and Obama confirmed three. Judicial Confirmations for January 2017, U.S.
CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-
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Trump depends on a few previously well-regarded judicial selection conventions, even as his White House ignores or underemphasizes other effective traditions. For instance, Trump, like every
contemporary President before him, afforded lead responsibility for
judicial selection to the White House Counsel, granted numerous related appointments duties to the Department of Justice, placed considerable responsibility for addressing district court openings with home
state politicians, and prioritized filling appeals court vacancies.25
When tendering appellate court picks, the initial White House
Counsel Don McGahn accentuated youth and conservative perspectives by deploying litmus tests, such as the nominees’ concerns about
complications which they attributed to the modern administrative
state; he also depended primarily on the “short list” of twenty-one
possible Supreme Court prospects whom the Federalist Society and
the Heritage Foundation assembled.26 These strategies continue to

42218-nyl_22-2 Sheet No. 58 Side B
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vacancies/2017/12/confirmations (last updated Dec. 1, 2017); Judicial Confirmations
for January 2010, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/2010/01/confirmations/html (last updated Jan. 1,
2010); Judicial Confirmations in the 107th, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/
judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/2001/12/confirma
tions/pdf (last updated Dec. 7, 2001); see supra, note 23 (confirming twenty additional Trump court of appeals nominees across 2019); 166 CONG. REC. S979 (daily
ed. Feb. 11, 2020) (confirming Eleventh Circuit Judge Andrew Brasher as the fiftyfirst Trump appellate court appointee); Yurvaj Joshi, Neil Gorsuch’s Legacy is Already Devastating, SLATE (Apr. 4, 2018), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/
04/neil-gorsuchs-legacy-is-already-devastating.html (Trump submitted a “torrent of
[sixty-nine] judicial nominations”).
25. Carl Tobias, Senate Gridlock and Federal Judicial Selection, 88 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 2233, 2240 (2013); Philip Rucker et al., ‘He’s Not Weak, Is He?’: Inside
Trump’s Quest to Alter the Judiciary, WASH. POST, (Dec. 19, 2017), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/hes-not-weak-is-he-inside-trumps-quest-to-alterthe-judiciary/2017/12/19/b653e568-e4de-11e7-833f-155031558ff4_story.html; Charlie Savage, Counsel Quietly Trying to Corral Trump While Pushing G.O.P’s Agenda,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/26/us/politics/trumpwhite-house-counsel-mcgahn.html?rref=collection%2Fbyline%2Fcharlie-savage&action=click&contentCollection=undefined&region=stream&module=stream_
unit&version=search&contentPlacement=1&pgtype=collection [https://perma.cc/
3RBV-KBY6]; Michael Schmidt & Maggie Haberman, McGahn, Soldier for Trump
and Witness Against Him, Leaves White House, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/10/17/us/politics/don-mcgahn-leaves-trump-administration.html (replacing McGahn with Pat Cipollone as the second White House Counsel).
26. Jeremy Peters, Trump’s New Judicial Litmus Test: Shrinking ‘the Administrative State,’ N.Y. TIMES (March 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/26/us/
politics/trump-judges-courts-administrative-state.html; Rebecca Ruiz et al., Trump
Stamps G.O.P. Imprint on the Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2020, at A1; Charlie
Savage, Trump is Rapidly Reshaping the Judiciary. Here’s How., N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/11/us/politics/trump-judiciary-appealscourts-conservatives.html; see infra note 77 and accompanying text. See generally
AMANDA HOLLIS-BRUSKY, IDEAS WITH CONSEQUENCES: THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY
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govern the selection process because the Federalist Society’s Executive Vice President, Leonard Leo, has been advising Trump on judicial
appointments since he became a presidential candidate.27 No previous
American chief executive has ceded such mammoth responsibility to a
non-governmental institution, although the political group may have
supplied President George W. Bush considerable help.28 Trump prioritizes the appellate courts because they comprise tribunals of last resort
for practically all cases, enunciate substantially greater policy than
district courts and release opinions which cover multiple jurisdictions.29 Virtually all Trump court of appeals confirmees are extremely
conservative, young and capable.
However, this White House violates, ignores or downplays longaccepted conventions regarding judicial selection. An essential custom
which the Trump Administration has ignored is aggressively consulting politicians who represent home states that experience vacancies,
an effective convention which modern administrations have followed;
this is a principal reason for blue slips, a policy which during Obama’s
presidency allowed home state legislators to prevent hearings on candidates until both senators dutifully returned slips. Democratic senators asserted that McGahn, Trump’s first White House Counsel,
practiced little or no active consultation respecting court of appeals
vacancies in their jurisdictions, and McGahn directly retorted that con-

42218-nyl_22-2 Sheet No. 59 Side A
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AND THE CONSERVATIVE COUNTERREVOLUTION (2015) (comprehensively analyzing
the Federalist Society and its effect on American law, legal institutions and society).
27. Jeffrey Toobin, The Conservative Pipelines to the Supreme Court, NEW
YORKER (Apr. 17, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/04/17/the-conservative-pipeline-to-the-supreme-court; Zoe Tillman, After Eight Years on the Sidelines, This Conservative Group Is Reshaping the Courts Under Trump, BUZZFEED
NEWS (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/zoetillman/after-eightyears-on-the-sidelines-this-conservative-group; see Madison Adler, Leonard Leo to
Keep Judicial Advocacy Focus in New Venture, U.S. LAW WEEK (Jan. 7, 2020, 6:31
PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/leonard-leo-to-keep-judicial-advocacy-focus-in-new-venture (Leo resigning as Society Executive Vice President but
remaining Co-Chair of its executive committee and judicial selection adviser to
Trump); Peters, supra note 26 (assessing Leonard Leo’s impact on judicial selection).
28. Jason DeParle, Debating the Subtle Sway of the Federalist Society, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 1, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/01/politics/politicsspecial1/debating-the-subtle-sway-of-the-federalist.html; see generally Neil A. Lewis, Conservative
Lawyers Voice Abundant Joy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2004, at A13. But see Donald
McGahn, Keynote Remarks at Federalist Society’s National Lawyers Convention
(Nov. 17, 2017), https://www.c-span.org/video/?437462-8/2017-national-lawyersconvention-white-house-counsel-mcgahn (denying that Trump outsourced judicial selection to the Federalist Society because it was “insourced” to McGahn).
29. See Solberg & Waltenburg, supra note 23; Tobias, supra note 25, at 2240–41;
163 CONG. REC. S8022–24 (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
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sultation did not appear in the Constitution.30 Wisconsin Democratic
Senator Tammy Baldwin accused President Trump of proffering a
Wisconsin Seventh Circuit nominee who lacked the required votes of
a bipartisan merit selection panel, which had rigorously evaluated, interviewed and suggested judicial prospects to Wisconsin senators for
over thirty years, while Senator Bob Casey (D-PA) proposed several
accomplished, mainstream choices for White House review, but he
later intimated that Trump only nominally considered them and marshaled someone else who became the nominee.31 A related illustration
of the White House’s approach was provided by Senator John Kennedy (R-LA), who alleged in a Louisiana Fifth Circuit nominee’s
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30. Thomas Kaplan, Trump is Putting Indelible Conservative Stamp on Judiciary,
N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/31/us/politics/trumpjudges.html; Jennifer Brooks & Stephen Montemayor, David Stras Gets LongDelayed Senate Hearing for Federal Judgeship, STAR TRIBUNE (Jan. 5, 2018, 2:44
PM), http://www.startribune.com/minnesota-justice-david-stras-set-for-senate-confirmation-hearing-wednesday/460755193; Melissa Nann Burke, Larsen’s Hearing for
Federal Bench Set for Next Week, DETROIT NEWS (Aug. 31, 2017, 9:56 AM), https://
www.detroitnews.com/story/news/politics/2017/08/31/larsen-federal-judicial-hearingset/105143430; Zoe Tillman, How Trump is Trying to Remake His Least Favorite
Court, BUZZFEED NEWS (Mar. 16, 2018), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/zoetillman/heres-who-the-white-house-pitched-for-the-federal-appeals; McGahn Remarks, supra note 28. But see Robert Barnes & Ed O’Keefe, Senate Republicans
Likely to Change Custom That Allows Democrats to Block Judicial Choices, WASH.
POST (May 25, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/senaterepublicans-consider-changing-custom-that-allows-democrats-to-block-judicialchoices/2017/05/25/d49ea61a-40b1-11e7-9869-bac8b446820a_story.html (Leo’s assertion that McGahn consulted home state senators more than any other White House
Counsel).
31. For developments involving Wisconsin, see Nominations: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (Jan. 24, 2018), https://
www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/01/24/2018/nominations; Todd Ruger, Grassley
Moves on Judicial Nominee Over Baldwin’s Objection, ROLL CALL (Jan. 24, 2018),
https://www.rollcall.com/news/politics/grassley-moves-judicial-nominee-baldwinsobjection; 164 CONG. REC. S2607 (daily ed. May 10, 2018) (confirming Michael
Brennan); Tobias, supra note 25, at 2256 (discussing the Wisconsin bipartisan merit
selection commission which all Wisconsin senators had successfully employed for
more than thirty years). For developments involving Pennsylvania, see Nominations:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (June 6, 2018), https://
www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/06/06/2018/nominations (Republican Judiciary
Committee Chair permitting hearing, despite Senator Casey’s retaining slip for a
Trump Third Circuit nominee and respecting Senator Toomey’s slip for an Obama
Third Circuit nominee); Jonathan Tamari, Pat Toomey Used Senate Tradition to Block
an Obama Pa. Judicial Pick. GOP Leaders Won’t Give Bob Casey the Same Deference, PHILA. INQUIRER (July 7, 2018), https://www.inquirer.com/philly/news/politics/
pat-toomey-used-senate-tradition-to-block-an-obama-judicial-pick-from-pa-gop-leaders-wont-give-bob-casey-the-same-deference-20180717.html.
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hearing that McGahn had effectively informed him that Kyle Duncan
would be the nominee.32
Another central deviation from longstanding precedent is
Trump’s decision to exclude the American Bar Association from judicial selection. Every president since Dwight Eisenhower, save George
W. Bush, had comprehensively incorporated ABA examinations and
ratings when naming candidates, and President Obama directly refrained from selecting nominees who drew “not qualified” rankings.33
However, President Trump has marshaled nine nominees who received this mark, and three appellate court and four district court nominees went on to rather easily capture appointment.34 McGahn
putatively was so critical of the ABA’s discharge of its judicial appointments process responsibilities that he intimated nominees might
eschew cooperation with the bar’s investigative activities.35
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32. For Counsel’s analogous interactions with the New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon and
Washington senators, see Carl Tobias, Curing the Federal Court Vacancy Crisis, 53
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 883, 892–93 (2018) (same regarding Trump, Obama and Bush
elevations); Kaplan, supra note 30. For Kennedy, see Nominations: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (Nov. 29, 2017), https://
www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/11/29/2017/nominations; Todd Ruger, Senate
Republicans Steamroll Judicial Process, ROLL CALL (Jan. 18, 2018), https://
www.rollcall.com/news/policy/the-senates-consent-machine; Sam Stein, GOP Pushes
Back as Trump’s Lawyer Tries to Stack the Bench, DAILY BEAST (Dec. 18, 2017),
https://www.thedailybeast.com/trump-nominees-humiliation-puts-spotlight-on-whitehouse-counsel-don-mcgahn.
33. 163 CONG. REC. S8022–24 (Statement of Sen. Feinstein); 163 CONG. REC.
S8042 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 2017) (statement of Sen. Durbin).
34. Standing Comm. on the Fed. Judiciary, Am. Bar Ass’n, Ratings of Article III
and Article IV Judicial Nominees 115th Congress, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/GAO/Web%20rating%20Chart%20Trump%20115.pdf
(last updated Dec. 13, 2018); 163 CONG. REC. S8022–24 (statement of Sen. Feinstein)
(asserting that the Senate confirmed the last judge with a “not qualified” rating in
1989). GOP senators contested Steven Grasz’s ABA rating, as the ABA is a liberal
political group. Nominations: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th
Cong. (Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/11/01/2017/nominations; Executive Business Meeting: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
115th Cong. (Dec. 7, 2017), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/12/07/2017/
executive-business-meeting-1; 163 CONG. REC. S7288 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 2017)
(statement of Sen. Sasse); 163 CONG. REC. S7965 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 2017) (confirming Steven Grasz); 164 CONG. REC. S5590 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 2018) (confirming Holly
Teeter); 164 CONG. REC. S5981 (daily ed. Aug. 28, 2018) (confirming Charles Goodwin); 164 CONG. REC. S7405 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 2018) (confirming Jonathan Kobes);
165 CONG. REC. S6442 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 2019) (confirming Justin Walker); id. at
S6842 (daily ed. Dec. 4, 2019) (confirming Sarah Pitlyk); id. at S6986 (daily ed. Dec.
11, 2019) (confirming Lawrence Van Dyke); infra notes 50, 59, 103 and accompanying text.
35. Adam Liptak, White House Ends Bar Association’s Role in Vetting Judges,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/31/us/politics/whitehouse-american-bar-association-judges.html; see Savage, supra note 26 (stating
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The chief executive deploys comparatively traditional procedures
when he nominates district court suggestions. For instance, President
Trump, like recent presidents, depends on recommendations from
home state officials and premises many nominations on competence
vis-à-vis ability to resolve substantial caseloads.36 Significant numbers
of President Trump’s submissions are preeminent choices, who earn
strong ABA ratings.37 However, three district court nominees withdrew, and the ABA rated three more not qualified, either because the
nominees failed to provide complete information or due to the administration’s failure to fully vet them or sufficiently prepare them for
hearings, while Trump admonished Senator Kennedy and his Republican colleagues to vote against nominees whom they considered unqualified.38 The appellate court focus also means that seventy-three
district court positions, forty-five of which involve emergencies, remain open, even though district jurists have responsibility for finally
resolving immense filings.
The executive ignores or underemphasizes numbers of effective
measures. The principal difficulty with Trump’s district court selection actions is his complete failure to prioritize the many vacancies, a
substantial percentage of which implicate judicial emergencies, in the
haste to appoint ideologically young, conservative judges for every
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ABA’s independent guardrail role is eroding). Sen. Mike Lee (R-UT) recently reiterated the proposition that the White House should admonish candidates to eschew cooperation with the ABA. Nominations: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 116th Cong., (Oct. 30, 2019), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/
10/30/2019/nominations.
36. Carl Tobias, Recalibrating Judicial Renominations in the Trump Administration, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 9, 19 (2017). But see Seung Min Kim, Trump
Could Remake Judiciary For 40 Years, POLITICO (Oct. 17, 2017), https://
www.politico.com/story/2017/10/17/trump-judges-nominees-court-picks-243834.
37. Texas District Court appointees Walter Counts and Karen Gren Scholer are instructive examples. See ABA Ratings, supra note 34.
38. Jennifer Bendery, Trump Pick Drops Out After Embarrassing Hearing, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/donald-trump-judicial-nominee-matthew-petersen_n_5a37ec14e4b0ff955ad51e82; Tom McCarthy,
Judge Not: Five Judicial Nominees Trump Withdrew – and Four Pending, GUARDIAN
(Mar. 10, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/law/2019/mar/10/judge-not-five-judicial-nominees-trump-withdrew-and-four-pending; Rucker et al., supra note 25; see
Press Release, White House, President Donald J. Trump Announces Renomination of
21 Judicial Nominees (Jan. 5, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/president-donald-j-trump-announces-renomination-21-judicial-nominees/. But
see Zoe Tillman, Trump Had a Good Year Confirming Judges, But He’s Still a Long
Way from Reshaping the Courts, BUZZFEED NEWS (Dec. 27, 2017), https://
www.buzzfeednews.com/article/zoetillman/trump-had-a-good-year-getting-judgesconfirmed-but-hes.
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appeals court opening.39 Emergencies have profoundly increased since
Republicans recaptured the Senate.40 President Trump correspondingly proffers fewer nominees in jurisdictions with Democratic senators, although most face plenty of emergencies.41 Indeed, California
encounters vacancies in seventeen district court posts, while New
York experiences openings in seven district court seats; all seventeen
of the California vacancies and four in New York constitute emergencies, but Trump neglected to recommend a sole candidate for twentythree openings until April 2018 or a single California position before
October of that year, while the administration has confirmed only fifteen jurists for the myriad vacancies and merely seven for district
court openings.42
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39. The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, which is the federal courts’ administrative arm, premises emergencies on protracted length and substantial
caseloads. Judicial Vacancy List for April 2020, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/
judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/2020/04/vacancies
(last updated Apr. 1, 2020) (the one appellate court vacancy is an emergency, and
fourty-five of seventy-three district court vacancies are judicial emergencies; overall
district court vacancies constitute ten percent of the total district judgeships and the
single appellate court opening comprises fewer than one percent); Savage, supra note
26.
40. Judicial emergencies skyrocketed from one dozen to as many as eighty-six. Id.
But see Press Release, White House, President Donald J. Trump Announces Nomination of Indiana Attorney James Sweeney to Fill Judicial Emergency (Nov. 1, 2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/president-donald-j-trump-announces-nomination-indiana-attorney-james-sweeney-fill-judicial-emergency/; Press
Release, White House, President Donald J. Trump Announces Tenth Wave of Judicial
Nominees (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/president-donald-j-trump-announces-tenth-wave-judicial-nominees/ [hereinafter Tenth
Wave]; see infra notes 45–46.
41. See Current Judicial Vacancies, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/judgesjudgeships/judicial-vacancies/current-judicial-vacancies (last updated Mar. 24, 2020)
(showing a large majority of open judicial seats in states with Democratic senators);
Judicial Emergencies, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/judicial-emergencies (last updated Mar. 24, 2020) (showing that states
such as California, New Jersey, and Washington—all with Democratic senators—
predominate in judicial emergency status). But see Press Release, White House, President Donald J. Trump Announces Ninth Wave of Judicial Nominees and Tenth Wave
of United States Attorney Nominees (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
presidential-actions/president-donald-j-trump-announces-ninth-wave-judicial-nominees-tenth-wave-united-states-attorney-nominees/ [hereinafter Ninth Wave] (nominating greater numbers of nominees from “blue” states).
42. Data verify “red” state priority. Current Judicial Vacancies, supra note 41; see
Press Release, White House, President Donald J. Trump Announces Thirteenth Wave
of Judicial Nominees and Seventh Wave of United States Marshal Nominees (Apr. 26,
2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/president-donald-j-trump-announces-thirteenth-wave-judicial-nominees-seventh-wave-united-states-marshal-nominees/ [hereinafter Thirteenth Wave] (sending a New York Second Circuit nominee);
Press Release, White House, President Donald J. Trump Announces Fourteenth Wave
of Judicial Nominees, Thirteenth Wave of United States Attorney Nominees, and
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Eighth Wave of United States Marshal Nominees (May 10, 2018), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/president-donald-j-trump-announces-fourteenth-wave-judicial-nominees-thirteenth-wave-united-states-attorney-nomineeseighth-wave-united-states-marshal-nominees/ [hereinafter Fourteenth Wave] (sending
seven New York district nominees); Press Release, White House, President Donald J.
Trump Announces Eighteenth Wave of Judicial Nominees, Eighteenth Wave of
United States Attorney Nominees, and Thirteenth Wave of United States Marshal
Nominees (Oct. 10, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/president-donald-j-trump-announces-eighteenth-wave-judicial-nominees-eighteenth-waveunited-states-attorney-nominees-thirteenth-wave-united-states-marshal-nominees/
[hereinafter Eighteenth Wave] (sending two New York Second Circuit nominees,
three California Ninth Circuit nominees and three California district nominees); Press
Release, White House, President Donald J. Trump Announces Intent to Nominate
Judicial Nominees (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/
president-donald-j-trump-announces-intent-nominate-judicial-nominees-2/ (renaming
California nominees but nominating Patrick Bumatay to the Southern District and
Daniel Bress to the Ninth Circuit); Press Release, White House, President Donald J.
Trump Announces Intent to Nominate Judicial Nominees (Jan. 22, 2019), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/president-donald-j-trump-announces-intentnominate-judicial-nominees/ (first renominee package); Press Release, White House,
President Donald J. Trump Announces Judicial Nominations (Apr. 8, 2019), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/president-donald-j-trump-announces-judicial-nominations/ (third renominee package); Press Release, White House, President
Donald Trump Announces Judicial Nominees (Sept. 12, 2019), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/president-donald-j-trump-announces-judicial-nominees-5/ [hereinafter Sept. 12, 2019 Press Release] (sending an additional
California district nominee); President Donald J. Trump Announces Judicial Nominees and United States Marshal Nominee (Sept. 20, 2019), https://www.whitehouse
.gov/presidential-actions/president-donald-j-trump-announces-judicial-nomineesunited-states-marshal-nominee-5/ [hereinafter Sept. 20, 2019 Press Release] (renominating Bumatay to the Ninth Circuit when Judge Carlos Bea announced that he would
assume senior status and four additional California district nominees); Press Release,
White House, President Donald Trump Announces Judicial Nominees (Nov. 6, 2019),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/president-donald-j-trump-announces-judicial-nominees-8/ [hereinafter Nov. 6, 2019 Press Release] (announcing
two additional New York district nominees); Press Release, White House, Eight
Nominations and One Withdrawal Sent to the Senate (Dec. 2, 2019), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/eight-nominations-one-withdrawal-sentsenate-2/ (sending two nominees to the Senate); Press Release, White House, Four
Nominations Sent to the Senate (Feb. 27, 2020), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/four-nominations-sent-senate-3/ (renominating one of two nominees
but neglecting to renominate the second as of Apr. 27, 2020); Press Release, White
House, Twelve Nominations Sent to the Senate (May 21, 2019), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/twelve-nominations-sent-senate-3/; Judicial Confirmations for January 2020, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/judgesjudgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/2019/01/confirmations (last
updated Mar. 24, 2020); Judicial Confirmations for January 2020, U.S. CTS., https://
www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/
2020/01/confirmations (last updated Jan. 1, 2020) (four New York Second Circuit
nominees and four California Ninth Circuit nominees approved; in states with two
GOP senators, confirming 103 judges and nominating 113 nominees; in states with
two Democratic senators, confirming forty-two judges and nominating fifty-eight
nominees).
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Another constructive route which Trump downplayed was improving minority judicial representation, especially in contrast to
Democrats.43 For example, he apparently implemented only nominal
efforts to pursue, identify and seat ethnic minorities or lesbian, gay,
bisexual, transgender or queer (LGBTQ) judicial prospects by, for instance, choosing diverse staff for appointments endeavors or urging
politicians to submit numbers of minority choices.44 Out of 240 nominees, merely two identify as LGBTQ and only thirty-six candidates
are persons of color,45 while among the president’s 191 confirmees,
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43. See Carl Tobias, President Donald Trump and Federal Bench Diversity, 74
WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 400, 410 (2018); Carl Tobias, President Donald
Trump’s War on Federal Judicial Diversity, 54 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 531, 547
(2019) [hereinafter Tobias, Trump’s War on Diversity]; Michael Nelson & Rachel
Hinkle, Trump Appoints Lots of White Men To Be Federal Judges, WASH. POST (Mar.
13, 2018) https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/03/12/
trump-appoints-lots-of-white-men-to-be-federal-judges-heres-why-it-matters/; Richard Wolf, Trump’s 87 Judge Picks Are 92% White, USA TODAY (Feb. 13, 2018)
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/02/13/trumps-87-picks-federaljudges-92-white-just-one-black-and-one-hispanic-nominee/333088002/.
44. LGBTQ means openly disclosed sexual preference, which some may have not
divulged. LGBTQ individuals are considered “minorities” throughout this piece. See
sources cited infra note 59.
45. Patrick Bumatay identifies as gay and Mary Rowland identifies as lesbian. The
initial ten appointees, infra note 46, Bumatay, Diane Gujarati, Anuraag Singhal,
Shireen Matthews, Steve Kim and Iris Lan are Asian Americans, Barbara Lagoa, Fernando Rodriguez, David Morales, Rodolfo Ruiz, Raúl Arias-Marxuach, Silvia Carreño-Coll, Fernando L. Amelle-Rocha, Sandy Leal and Franklin Valderrama are
Latino/as; Terry Moorer, Rodney Smith, Rossie Alston, Milton Younge, Jason Pulliam, Ada Brown, Stephanie Dawkins Davis, Robert Molloy and Bernard Jones are
African American; Richard Myers is Jamaican and Hala Jarbou is Chaldean. Press
Release, White House, President Donald J. Trump Announces Seventh Wave of Judicial Candidates (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/
president-donald-j-trump-announces-seventh-wave-judicial-candidates/ [hereinafter
Seventh Wave]; Ninth Wave, supra note 41; Tenth Wave, supra note 40; Thirteenth
Wave, supra note 42; Press Release, White House, President Donald J. Trump Announces Judicial Nominees, a United States Attorney Nominee, and United States
Marshal Nominees (Mar. 1, 2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/
president-donald-j-trump-announces-judicial-nominees-united-states-attorney-nominee-united-states-marshal-nominees/; Press Release, White House, President Donald
J. Trump Announces Judicial Nominees (Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
presidential-actions/president-donald-j-trump-announces-judicial-nominees/; Aug. 14,
2019 Press Release, supra note 42; Sept. 12, 2019 Press Release, supra note 42; Sept.
20, 2019 Press Release, supra note 42; Press Release, White House, President Donald
J. Trump Announces Judicial Nominees (Oct. 2, 2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
presidential-actions/president-donald-j-trump-announces-judicial-nominees-6/ [hereinafter Oct. 2, 2019 Press Release]; Nov. 6, 2019 Press Release, supra note 42; Press
Release, White House, Fifteen Nominees and Two Withdrawals Sent to the Senate
(Feb. 12, 2020), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/fifteen-nominations-two-withdrawals-sent-senate/; Press Release, White House, Eight Nominees and
One Withdrawal Sent to the Senate (Mar. 18, 2020), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
presidental-actions/eight-nominations-one-withdrawal-sent-senate-3/.
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only two identify as LGBTQ and only twenty-eight are people of
color.46
B. Confirmation Process
The Republican Senate majority confirmation system directly
mirrors the deleterious elements of the Trump Administration nomination regime by jettisoning, amending or undermining lengthy customs
or by abolishing, changing or diluting ideas which have operated effectively for decades. This is exemplified by Republicans’ selective
revisions in (1) the 100-year-old practice for blue slips—which permit
Judiciary Committee hearings only when senators proffer slips—and
(2) panel hearings.
In fall 2017, Chuck Grassley (R-IA), who served as Chair of the
Senate Judiciary Committee across the past two Congresses, announced that he would develop an exception to the blue slip policy for
appellate court nominees by scheduling panel hearings on judicial candidates who lacked slips presented by any home state member, particularly when those senators opposed nominees for “political or
ideological” reasons.47 This was a significant departure from the blue
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46. Bumatay identifies as gay and Rowland identifies as a lesbian. The people of
color are Amul Thapar, James Ho, John Nalbandian, Neomi Rao, Michael Park, Kenneth Lee, Karen Gren Scholer, Jill Otake, Martha Pacold, Nicholas Ranjan, Singhal,
Lagoa, Rodriguez, Moorer, Morales, Ruiz, Arias-Marxuach, Smith, Alston, Younge,
Pulliam, Brown, Myers, Dawkins Davis, Jones, Molloy and Carreno-Coll. Press Release, White House, President Donald J. Trump Announces Intent to Nominate Judge
Amul R. Thapar for the Sixth Circuit (Mar. 21, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
presidential-actions/president-donald-j-trump-announces-intent-nominate-judge-amulr-thapar-u-s-court-appeals-sixth-circuit/; Press Release, White House, President Donald J. Trump Announces Eighth Wave of Judicial Candidates (Sept. 28, 2017), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/president-donald-j-trump-announceseighth-wave-judicial-candidates/; Seventh Wave, supra note 45; Judicial Confirmations for March 2020, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/2020/03/confirmations (last updated March
24, 2020); Judicial Confirmations for December 2019, U.S. CTS., https://
www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/
2019/12/confirmations (last updated Dec. 1, 2018); Judicial Confirmations for December 2018, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/2018/12/confirmations (last updated Dec. 1, 2018);
Judicial Confirmations for December 2017, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/
judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/2017/12/confirmations (last updated Dec. 1, 2017).
47. 163 CONG. REC. S7174 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 2017) (statement of Sen. Grassley);
163 CONG. REC. S7285 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 2017); see Nominations: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (Nov. 29, 2017) (statement of Sen.
Grassley), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/11/29/2017/nominations; Memorandum from the Senate Judiciary Comm. Majority to the Members of the News
Media (Nov. 2, 2017), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/His-
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slip tradition, which required blue slips from both home state senators—a tradition that Republican and Democratic senators closely followed throughout all eight years of Obama’s time in office, which
constituted the most recent, applicable precedent.48
That situation continued to deteriorate when Grassley provided a
January 2018 hearing for the Wisconsin Seventh Circuit nominee
Michael Brennan whom Trump proposed—even though the White
House had engaged in nominal consultation with Senator Baldwin and
the nominee lacked the required number of votes from the venerable
Wisconsin bipartisan state merit selection panel—especially because
Grassley minimally supported allowing the Chair (himself) ample discretion to determine whether the chief executive had “adequately consulted” about the nominee.49 Grassley resolutely continued this
approach by setting a committee hearing in May for Oregon Ninth
Circuit nominee Ryan Bounds, although McGahn had consulted little
with Oregon Democratic Senators Ron Wyden and Jeff Merkley and
the nominee ostensibly withheld considerable pertinent material from
the Oregon bipartisan merit selection vetting commission.50
Grassley expressly acknowledged that blue slips were intended to
ensure that Presidents consult home state politicians while protecting
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tory%20of%20the%20Blue%20Slip.pdf; Carl Hulse, Judge’s Death Gives Trump a
Chance To Remake a Vexing Court, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/04/07/us/politics/trump-reinhardt-ninth-circuit.html.
48. Grassley strictly followed that blue slip policy when he served as Chair in
Obama’s final half term, as did Patrick Leahy (D-VT) during the initial six years. See
Executive Business Meeting of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (Feb. 15,
2018) (statements of Sens. Grassley and Leahy), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/
meetings/02/15/2018/executive-business-meeting.
49. Under Wisconsin merit selection panel rules, the candidate needed a specific
number of votes to secure a commission recommendation to the senators, which Brennan lacked, but Sen. Ron Johnson (R) forwarded his name to Trump who nominated
and confirmed Brennan anyway over the strong objection of Sen. Baldwin. S. Judiciary Comm., Executive Business Meeting of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th
Cong. (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/02/15/2018/executive-business-meeting; see supra note 31, infra text accompanying note 79.
50. Maxine Bernstein, Oregon’s U.S. Senators Say Federal Prosecutor Ryan
Bounds Unsuitable for 9th Circuit Vacancy, OREGONIAN (Feb. 12, 2018), https://
www.oregonlive.com/portland/2018/02/oregons_us_senators_say_federa.html; Jimmy
Hoover, 9th Circ. Pick Forces Grassley to Choose: Trump or Tradition?, LAW360
(Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1025855; Nominations: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (May 9, 2018), https://
www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/05/09/2018/nominations.; Executive Business
Meeting Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (June 7, 2018), https://
www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/06/07/2018/executive-business-meeting (11-10
panel approval).; 164 CONG. REC. S5098 (daily ed. July 19, 2018) (withdrawing the
nomination); see Bernstein, supra note 50 (assessing the four candidates, including
Bounds, whom the panel recommended and senators’ reasons for opposing Bounds).

42218-nyl_22-2 Sheet No. 63 Side B

05/20/2020 13:21:22

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYL\22-2\NYL203.txt

438

unknown

Seq: 18

LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY

19-MAY-20

7:52

[Vol. 22:421

senators’ prerogatives involving judicial selection and the essential interest in selection of the electorate they diligently represent. Indeed,
Senator Grassley clearly respected slips for district court prospects, as
does Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC), the new Chair.51 However,
GOP senators had persistently relied on slips to exclude able, moderate circuit nominees during Obama’s tenure, many for political or ideological reasons, the very bases which Grassley explicitly deemed
illegitimate.52
Grassley also changed the effective traditions and rules which
had governed panel hearings. The Chair arranged ten sessions in
which two circuit, and frequently three or four district, court nominees
testified at one time without minority party approval; this radically
contrasted with Democrats’ scheduling merely three analogous nominee committee hearings throughout the eight Obama years and even
then only under peculiar conditions and with specific Republican permission.53 Most notorious was the Republican Senate majority’s
scheduling of a major hearing for two controversial Trump Administration appellate choices, four district nominees and the ABA repre-
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51. See sources cited supra note 47. Graham, who became Chair in January 2019,
vowed to follow Grassley’s blue slip policy. Executive Business Meeting Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (Feb. 7, 2019), https://www.judiciary.senate
.gov/meetings/02/07/2019/executive-business-meeting. Grassley has signaled that he
would like to become the Chair again in 2021, if Republicans retain a Senate majority.
Jordain Carney, Grassley to Take Back Judiciary Gavel If GOP Keeps Senate in 2020,
THE HILL (Oct. 31, 2019, 10:40 AM), https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/468292grassley-to-take-back-judiciary-gavel-if-gop-keeps-senate-in-2020; Marianne Levine,
Lindsey Graham Will Give Judiciary Chairmanship Back to Chuck Grassley, POLITICO (Oct. 31, 2019, 12:13 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2019/10/31/grahamjudiciary-chairmanship-grassley-062993.
52. See supra text accompanying note 42. Many GOP senators even offered no
reasons for retaining blue slips. See supra note 22.
53. 163 CONG. REC. S8022–24 (statement of Sen. Feinstein); Joshi, supra note 24;
see supra note 18 (prior history). For example, Obama nominated North Carolina
Fourth Circuit Judges Albert Diaz and James Wynn on the same day, and the Senate
assessed the nominees together in the confirmation process. Carl Tobias, Filling the
Fourth Circuit Vacancies, 89 N.C. L. REV. 2161, 2174–76 (2011). Graham conducted
February 13, March 13, September 25, October 16, and October 30, 2019 hearings in
which two circuit nominees testified. See, e.g., Nominations: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (Feb. 13, 2019), https://
www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/02/13/2019/nominations; Nominations: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (Mar. 13, 2019), https://
www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/nominations-hearing; Nominations: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (Sept. 25, 2019), https://
www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/09/25/2019/nominations; Nominations: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (Oct. 16, 2019), https://
www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/10/16/2019/nominations; Nominations: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (Oct. 30, 2019), https://
www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/10/30/2019/nominations.

42218-nyl_22-2 Sheet No. 64 Side A

05/20/2020 13:21:22

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYL\22-2\NYL203.txt

2020]

unknown

Seq: 19

FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT VACANCIES

19-MAY-20

7:52

439

sentative, who deftly explained the vociferously-contested “not
qualified” rating which the ABA had assigned a Trump court of appeals nominee.54 In fact, the panel session was so crowded that members had no time for questioning the district court nominees, which
may have represented another strategy that the Republican Senate majority invoked to prevent Democrats from comprehensively scrutinizing nominees.55
Many hearings appeared rushed, while they lacked the careful
questioning appropriate for nominees who could actually enjoy life
tenure.56 For most nominees, senators had only five minutes to present
questions. Certain nominees seemed to avoid providing substantive
answers to senators’ questions by delaying, repeating multiple queries
and deflecting or evasively responding to questions which members
posited. Illuminating was the lack of cooperation which multiple
Texas district court nominees displayed.57 Other nominees were reluc-
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54. Nominations: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong.
(Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/11/15/2017/nominations
[hereinafter November 15 Hearing]; Nominations: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/08/08/2017/nominations (similarly packed); Nominations: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (Oct. 24, 2018), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/10/24/2018/nominations [hereinafter October 24 Hearing] (conducting hearing for two Ninth Circuit nominees after the Senate had recessed to
campaign); Nominations: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong.
(Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/08/01/2018/nominations
(conducting hearing for a New York Second Circuit nominee and six New York district nominees while the Kavanaugh nomination was pending).
55. They merely had time for introductions. November 15 Hearing, supra note 54;
see 163 CONG. REC. S8022–24 (statement of Sen. Feinstein) (stating committee conducted five appellate court nominee hearings over November, a month that included a
one-week recess).
56. See supra text accompanying note 29; 163 CONG. REC. S8022–24 (statement of
Sen. Feinstein). For lack of care, see 163 CONG. REC. S8022–24 (statement of Sen.
Feinstein). For a very recent example, see Nominations: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (Dec. 4, 2019), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/12/04/2019/nominations (conducting hearing for one appellate court nominee and
five district court nominees on the same day that the Senate conducted floor votes on
six district court nominees, so members had practically no time for questioning the
district court nominees).
57. E.g., Executive Business Meeting Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th
Cong. (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/01/18/2018/executive-business-meeting (Matthew J. Kacsmaryk); Nominations: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.judiciary.senate
.gov/meetings/04/25/2018/nominations (Michael Truncale); Nominations: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (June 6, 2018), https://
www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/06/06/2018/nominations (David Morales); see
163 CONG. REC. S8022–24 (statement of Sen. Feinstein). But see 163 CONG. REC.
S8025 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 2017) (statement of Sen. Cornyn) (praising the strong judicial qualifications of many Texas district nominees).
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tant to directly state whether, once confirmed, they would recuse
themselves on matters related to issues (such as discrimination, civil
rights, and health care) that the nominees had litigated as practicing
attorneys or about which they had articulated clearly-held views.58
These considerations meant that it was unsurprising that a third of
Trump nominees had compiled anti-LGBTQ records.59
The discussions which preceded committee reporting of most
nominees also lacked much valuable context or content. Senators negligibly addressed questions raised by other senators, even those which
implicated qualifications that are crucial for life-tenured federal judges
who must analyze essential issues.
A significant deviation from “regular order” was Chair
Grassley’s detrimental choice to not await conclusion of American
Bar Association evaluations and ratings before conducting panel discussions and votes, despite incessant requests from Judiciary Committee Ranking Member Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) that he wait until the
ABA’s nominee materials arrived. Grassley responded that he would
not permit what numerous GOP senators characterize as an external
“political group” to dictate committee scheduling.60 It, therefore, was
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58. Nominations: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (Feb.
5, 2019), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/02/05/2019/nominations (Neomi
Rao); Nominations: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (Apr.
11, 2018), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/04/11/2018/nominations-1
(Wendy Vitter); Nominations: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th
Cong. (July 11, 2018), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/07/11/2018/nominations (Stephen Clark); see 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2012) (recusal law); Josh Gerstein,
Trump-Appointed Judge Won’t Recuse from Dossier Case, POLITICO, Feb. 16, 2018,
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/02/16/trump-dossier-judge-recuse-416844;
Joshi, supra note 24 (judges’ potential conflicts).
59. Stacking the Courts: The Fight Against Trump’s Extremist Judicial Nominees,
LAMBDA LEGAL, https://www.lambdalegal.org/judicial-nominees (last updated Jan.
31, 2019); see Eleanor Clift, What Trump’s Judicial Nominees Have in Common:
They Really Don’t Want LGBTQ People to Have Rights, THE DAILY BEAST, Mar. 12,
2018, https://www.thedailybeast.com/what-trumps-judicial-nominees-have-in-common-they-really-dont-want-lgbtq-people-to-have-rights; Dave Phillips, New Rule for
Transgender Troops: Stick to Your Birth Sex, or Leave, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2019,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/13/us/transgender-troops-ban.html. These factors
meant that hearings could become comparatively meaningless exercises in which participants exchanged relatively few substantive ideas.
60. Aug. 1, 2018 Hearing, supra note 54 (two district court nominees received no
ABA ratings before the hearing and four nominees had ratings posted the day of the
hearing); Michael Macagnone, DC Court Picks Face Panel Ahead of ABA Report,
LAW360 (June 28, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/939442/dc-court-picksface-senate-panel-ahead-of-aba-report; see sources cited supra note 34; Tobias, supra
note 22 (regular order); Elliot Mincberg, 4 Steps to Restore Thorough Senate Vetting
of Judicial Nominees, THE HILL (Dec. 26, 2017, 1:30 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/366490-4-steps-to-restore-thorough-bipartisan-senate-vetting-of-judicial-nominees; (urging that hearings be conducted after receipt of ABA reports). But
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predictable that the more controversial selections received party-line
ballots and that no Republican committee member voted against a single nominee across 2017.61
After the committee marshaled approval of nominees and they
came to the floor, similar, albeit less troubling, dimensions frustrated
meaningful nominee review: the Democratic minority demanded cloture and roll call votes for virtually all nominees, even for accomplished, mainstream individuals who went on to smoothly win
confirmation; the GOP possessed the Senate majority; and the 2013
release of the “nuclear option” meant that nominees were confirmed
with a simple majority ballot.62 Particularly egregious was the compression of four appeals court nominees’ debates and chamber votes
into less than a 2017 week following minimal prior notice and even
ramming six appellate confirmations through in one week in 2018 after de minimis notice.63 The many nominees, their massive records
and the tardy notice left Democrats as the minority party without sufficient resources to dutifully prepare.64 More relevant to this article was
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see 163 CONG. REC. S8022–24 (statement of Sen. Feinstein) (touting ABA input’s
value); supra notes 26–28 (analyzing the role of Federalist Society, another external
political entity).
61. See, e.g., Nominations: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th
Cong. (Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/11/01/2017/nominations (approving Eighth Circuit nominee Grasz); S. Judiciary Comm., Executive Business Meeting of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (Feb. 15, 2018), https://
www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/02/15/2018/executive-business-meeting (approving Seventh Circuit nominee Brennan); infra note 83 (lone negative Republican panel
vote).
62. The nuclear option is a practice that allows a majority vote to amend the Senate
rules, rather than a larger margin, as the Senate rules require. 159 CONG. REC. S8418
(daily ed. Nov. 21, 2013) (nuclear option); Carl Tobias, Filling the D.C. Circuit Vacancies, 91 IND. L. J. 121, 131 (2015). In 2017, the Republican Senate majority margin was 51-49 and currently is 53-47.
63. Feinstein said 2017 notice came Thursday evening as senators recessed. Executive Business Meeting Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (Nov. 2,
2017), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/11/02/2017/executive-businessmeeting; Schedule for Tuesday, October 31, 2017, SENATE DEMOCRATS: THE FLOOR
(Oct. 30, 2017, 7:40 PM), https://www.democrats.senate.gov/2017/10/30/schedulefor-tuesday-october-31-2017. For 2018, see Schedule for Pro Formas and Monday,
May 7, 2018, 8,022 SENATE DEMOCRATS (Apr. 26, 2018, 5:38 PM), https://
www.democrats.senate.gov/2018/04/26/schedule-for-pro-formas-and-monday-may-72018.
64. Feinstein proffered these notions. Executive Business Meeting, supra note 63;
Ruger, supra note 32. The most appellate court judges whom Bush appointed in one
week were three in June 2004 and June 2005. Judicial Confirmations — 109th Congress, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/
archive-judicial-vacancies/2005/12/confirmations/pdf (last updated Dec. 1, 2005); Judicial Confirmations — 108th Congress, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/judgesjudgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/2004/08/confirmations/pdf
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similar compression of district court nominee ballots immediately
before Senate recesses. For example, from December 3 through December 5, 2019, eight trial-level prospects secured appointment; between July 30 and 31, 2019, thirteen nominees captured appointment;
in October 2018, twelve individuals secured appointment after limited
debate; and in August of that year seven possibilities captured appointment, most on voice vote.65
The quality of floor debates which preceded confirmation ballots
resembled that of Judiciary Committee discussions of nominees; some
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(last updated Aug. 1, 2004). The most appellate court jurists whom Obama appointed
were five in December 2010, when the Senate recessed at the Congress’ end and the
nominees had waited protracted periods; the most judges whom Obama appointed in
other weeks were two. Judicial Confirmations for January 2018, U.S. CTS., https://
www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/
2018/01/confirmations (last updated Jan. 1, 2018); Judicial Confirmations for January
2017, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/
archive-judicial-vacancies/2017/01/confirmations (last updated Jan. 1, 2017); Judicial
Confirmations for January 2016, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/2016/01/confirmations (last updated Jan. 1, 2016); Judicial Confirmations for January 2015, U.S. CTS., https://
www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/
2015/01/confirmations/html (last updated Jan. 1, 2015); Judicial Confirmations for
January 2014, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/2014/01/confirmations/html (last updated Jan. 1,
2014); Judicial Confirmations for January 2013, U.S. CTS., https://
www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/
2013/01/confirmations/html (last updated Jan. 1, 2013); Judicial Confirmations for
January 2012, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/2012/01/confirmations/html (last updated Jan. 1,
2012); Judicial Confirmations for January 2011, U.S. CTS., https://
www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/
2011/01/confirmations/html (last updated Jan. 1, 2011); Judicial Confirmations for
January 2010, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/2010/01/confirmations/html (last updated Jan. 1,
2010); Judicial Confirmations — 110th Congress, U.S. CTS., https://
www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/
2009/01/confirmations/pdf (last updated Jan. 1, 2009).
65. 165 CONG. REC. D1313 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 2019), 165 CONG. REC. D1320 (daily
ed. Dec. 4, 2019) & 165 CONG. REC. D1328 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 2019) (none earned
voice votes); 165 CONG. REC. D932-33 (daily digest July 30, 2019) & 165 CONG.
REC. D939 (daily digest July 31, 2019) (three earned voice votes); 164 CONG. REC.
D1133 (daily digest Oct. 11, 2018) (half earned voice votes); 164 CONG. REC. D959
(daily digest Aug. 25, 2018) (six of seven earned voice votes); see Jordain Carney,
Senate Confirms Eight Trump Court Picks in Three Days, THE HILL (Dec. 5, 2019,
4:20 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/473271-senate-confirms-eight-trumpcourt-picks-in-three-day. These efforts had impacts that were rather comparable to
appointing court of appeals nominees. See sources cited supra notes 63–64. Stacking
circuit approvals also devours resources that could be devoted to confirming district
judges. U.S. SENATE, 116TH CONG., EXECUTIVE CALENDAR NO. 237 (2020), https://
www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/executive_calendar/2020/03_255_2020.pdf (ten district court nominees remain on the Senate floor awaiting votes).
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were even less instructive than the panel exchanges.66 Senate Democrats required cloture votes for practically all choices, while much of
the thirty hours granted for debate after cloture concerned issues that
were not actually related to specific candidates and, even when particular lawmakers discussed them, few members were in attendance to
hear the floor remarks because other Senate business enjoyed higher
priority.67 Republican senators apparently decided that the rule which
affords thirty hours of post-cloture debate regarding district nominees
was so ineffective for assessing nominees’ qualifications or so effective for the opposition party to analyze these qualifications that the
Republican chamber majority summarily decreased the number of
hours to two.68
The Senate Republican majority, like President Trump’s White
House, has prioritized appellate court over district court appointments;
consideration of nominees from jurisdictions represented by Republican senators; appointment of extremely conservative white males; and
filling non-emergency openings. Yet many of these phenomena derive
primarily from the nominating system.69 These shared priorities
helped Trump shatter the record for most court of appeals nominees
confirmed in a President’s first year. However, the priorities also left
more than twenty district court nominees without final ballots and a
substantial number of appellate court and district court openings at the
completion of 2017. Moreover, relatively few nominees received approval in states represented by Democrats, two minority nominees
won confirmation and the number of emergency vacancies dramatically increased.70 The priorities remained unchanged and concomi42218-nyl_22-2 Sheet No. 66 Side A
05/20/2020 13:21:22

66. See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text.
67. For instance, during most of the chamber debates on the four district court nominees whom the Senate confirmed throughout the week of April 8, 2019, the only
Senate members who heard the speeches were the senators who delivered them and
the presiding officers. See, e.g., 165 CONG. REC. S2351 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 2019)
(debate regarding Western District of Oklahoma Judge Patrick Wyrick); 165 CONG.
REC. S2297 (daily ed. Apr. 9, 2019) (debate regarding District of Colorado Judge
Daniel Domenico).
68. 165 CONG. REC. S2220 (daily ed. Apr. 3, 2019); Executive Business Meeting
Before the S. Comm. on Rules & Admin., 116th Cong. (Feb. 13, 2019), https://
www.rules.senate.gov/hearings/full-committee-business-meeting (approving S. Res.
50); Burgess Everett & Marianne Levine, McConnell Preps New Nuclear Option to
Speed Trump Judges, POLITICO (Mar. 6, 2019, 5:05 AM), https://www.politico.com/
story/2019/03/06/trump-mcconnell-judges-1205722; Carl Hulse, G.O.P. Ready to
‘Nuke’ Senate Democrats Again Over Nominee Delays, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/20/us/politics/senate-nuclear-option-trump.html.
69. See supra notes 22–25, 27 and accompanying text.
70. U.S. SENATE, 115TH CONG., EXECUTIVE CALENDAR NO. 188 (2017), https://
www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/executive_calendar/2017/12_23_2017.pdf; supra
notes 39–46, infra notes 74, 84 and accompanying text.
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tantly allowed Trump to set the record for most court of appeals
judges appointed over a chief executive’s second and third years, but
they continued to have problematic effects on district court appointments. At the end of 2018, a paltry number of choices realized approval in jurisdictions with Democratic senators, the President
confirmed few minority nominees and emergencies were very high,
while at 2019’s conclusion, the statistics had minimally improved.71
C. Explanations for Nomination and Confirmation Problems

05/20/2020 13:21:22

71. 165 CONG. REC. D3 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 2019). At 2019’s conclusion, more blue
state and minority nominees captured appointment, while emergencies decreased
somewhat. 165 CONG. REC. D8 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 2020); see sources cited supra note
46. Compare Judicial Emergencies for January 2019, U.S. CTS., https://
www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/
2019/01/emergencies (last updated Jan. 1, 2019), with Judicial Emergencies for January 2020, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/
archive-judicial-vacancies/2020/01/emergencies (last updated Jan. 1, 2020).
72. Participants’ privacy needs may support limiting information. See Tobias, supra
note 21, at 1103. But see Press Release, White House, Doing What He Said He
Would: President Trump’s Transparent, Principled and Consistent Process for Choosing a Supreme Court Nominee (Jan. 31, 2017), whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/
said-president-trumps-transparent-principled-consistent-process-choosing-supremecourt-nominee/ [https://perma.cc/RFR6-5SSM].
73. See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text.
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It is difficult to precisely identify why multiple complications
permeate the district court nomination and confirmation regimes,
mainly because the chief executive and the Senate supply comparatively little information about nominations and confirmations.72 However, explanations might be drawn from the previous account.
A critical reason for problems with trial level nominees is that the
administration emphasizes seating myriad conservatives in appellate
court vacancies to the near exclusion of most other important activity,
namely district court confirmations. Trump expressly asks White
House Counsel to assign circuit openings massive significance, while
the President and the Counsel rely heavily on Federalist Society ideas,
even when the President does not completely outsource selection to
this external political group.73
The Trump Administration correspondingly seems to (1) deemphasize open district court positions and grant more responsibility for
those nominations to home state politicians, (2) downplay the many
vacancies in jurisdictions represented by Democratic senators, (3) undervalue minority representation on the federal courts and (4) ignore
judicial emergencies which plague numerous courts. This limited attention is misguided because (1) district court jurists are the federal
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74. See supra notes 36, 39–42, infra notes 88–91 and accompanying text.
75. For how emphasis on appellate court vacancies showed why certain district
nominees were weak, see supra note 38; see also supra note 34 (appellate court not
qualified ABA ratings). For Justice Department and White House Counsel Office inadequacies, see supra notes 33–35, 38.
76. See generally ANONYMOUS, A WARNING (2019); DAVID FRUM, TRUMPOCRACY
(2018); BOB WOODWARD, FEAR: TRUMP IN THE WHITE HOUSE (2018). Newspapers
cover this every day. E.g., Mark Landler & Julie Hirschfield Davis, After Another
Week of Chaos, Trump Repairs to Palm Beach. No One Knows What Comes Next.,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/23/us/politics/trumpchaos-trade-russia-national-security.html; Ashley, Parker et al., Trump Chooses Impulse Over Strategy As Crises Mount, WASH. POST (Apr. 12, 2018), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-chooses-impulse-over-strategy-as-crisesmount/2018/04/11/884e33c2-3d9d-11e8-974f-aacd97698cef_story.html.
77. Olivia Paschal, President Trump’s Speech Declaring a National Emergency,
THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/02/
trumps-declaration-national-emergency-full-text/582928/; Gillian Metzger, 1930s
Redux: The Administrative State Under Seige, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (2017); Jen-
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judiciary’s workhorses and finally resolve plentiful cases, (2) senators’
party affiliation should certainly not affect the distribution of court
judicial resources and concomitantly justice’s quality, (3) minority jurists furnish numbers of benefits and (4) the emergency designation
clearly applies in the most egregious situations.74 The appellate court
emphasis may also reveal why particular district court nominees
lacked the required qualifications: the Justice Department and the
White House Counsel deployed insufficient evaluations and dedicated
comparatively minimal resources to district court candidate scrutiny
and nominee preparation for committee hearings. The DOJ and Counsel also decidedly ignored most ABA candidate evaluations and ratings previous, and even subsequent, to nominations.75
In fairness, the President experienced the significant start-up
costs of assembling a government after eight years of Democratic
White House control. Trump had not served in the public sphere or
run for elected office before he captured the presidency. He also campaigned on a promise to “drain the swamp” and radically discombobulate traditional politics, salient elements which the President’s
unconventional management style and chaotic administration infighting purportedly magnified.76 Trump also lacked comprehension of the
rule of law, federal courts, separation of powers, and judicial selection, evidenced by (1) his searing criticisms of numerous federal appellate court and district court jurists who wrote opinions which
frustrated Trump’s political endeavors and (2) constant initiatives to
appoint many judges who could reliably support presidential actions,
notably constructing a border wall absent congressionally-appropriated funding or disrupting the contemporary administrative state.77
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nifer Bendery, Trump Has No Idea Why He Gets To Fill So Many Empty Court Seats,
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/trump-federaljudges-obama-republicans_n_5abd47c4e4b0a47437a98594; Peters, supra note 26;
Rucker et al., supra note 25; Tillman, supra note 30; 163 CONG. REC. S8022–24
(statements of Sens. Feinstein, Leahy, Warren).
78. Michael Cohen, Mitch McConnell, Republican Nihilist, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Feb.
25, 2019), https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2019/02/25/mitch-mcconnell-republicannihilist/; Charles Homans, Mitch McConnell Got Everything He Wanted, But At What
Cost, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/22/magazine/
mcconnell-senate-trump.html; see generally MITCH MCCONNELL, THE LONG GAME
(2015); Hulse, supra note 48; Rucker et al., supra note 25.
79. See supra notes 47–52 and accompanying text.
80. See supra note 51 (Grassley and Graham retaining blue slips for district courts);
Executive Business Meeting Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (Feb.
15, 2018), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/02/15/2018/executive-businessmeeting (statements of Sens. Crapo, Feinstein, & Leahy); supra notes 24–29, 51. For
assignments of circuit judgeships to states, see Tobias, supra note 53, at 2171–74;
infra note 123.
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Those complications were multiplied by the telling need to speedily
fill the protracted Supreme Court vacancy that resulted from Justice
Antonin Scalia’s death and the 103 lower court posts that remained
open upon Trump’s inauguration, both of which had been orchestrated
by Republican Senate Majority Leader, Mitch McConnell (KY) and
his colleagues.78
Numerous analogous concerns—especially the seemingly crucial
necessity for the Trump Administration and the Republican Senate
majority to promptly confirm the maximum possible number of conservative, young appellate court judges—explain the many complications in the selection regime. At the panel level, the weakening of the
Senate’s blue slip policy epitomizes these difficulties. In Grassley’s
haste to rapidly appoint numerous conservative appellate court jurists,
he undercut this measure which had long operated effectively.
Grassley instituted an exception to the blue slip policy for court of
appeals nominees by granting the Chair of the Judiciary Committee
substantial discretion to ascertain in case-by-case application of subjective criteria whether the White House had adequately consulted
politicians from home states.79 Grassley’s reasoning was unconvincing. Nominal precedent supported distinguishing appellate court slips
from district court slips, because Republican and Democratic politicians concur that appeals court vacancies are more consequential, the
judges are fewer, and their rulings cover several jurisdictions and certainly articulate greater policy, even though Grassley and Graham did
correctly retain slips for district courts.80
Perhaps less troubling was the rushed setting of panel hearings,
discussions and votes, which could analogously have been motivated
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by the supposed need to quickly process myriad young, conservative
appellate court judges.81 Similar concepts apply to Grassley’s eschewing employment of ABA nominee evaluations and ratings prior to
committee ballots and McConnell’s decision to stack final votes respecting substantial numbers of appeals court and trial level prospects.82 Nevertheless, GOP members’ utter failure to cast one no vote
against a single court pick on a 2017 panel ballot and more than a lone
negative confirmation vote show that panel hearings, discussions and
votes can actually be less essential than Grassley’s blue slip construct,
hurried chamber processing and GOP Senate majority rubberstamping
more generally.83
III.
CONSEQUENCES

05/20/2020 13:21:22

81. See supra text accompanying notes 53–59, 61. Committee hearings, discussions
and votes do clearly warrant improvement.
82. See supra notes 63–66. The panel needs ABA input before votes and the chamber requires decreased stacking of nominees.
83. Lockstep voting suggests that the application of putatively more effective practices may not improve the confirmation process or alleviate the vacancy crisis. See
supra note 61 and accompanying text (no negative GOP panel vote); 163 CONG. REC.
S7351 (daily ed. Nov. 28, 2017) (Sen. Kennedy’s lone negative GOP final vote).
84. See supra notes 39–46 and accompanying text.
85. The statistics for judicial emergencies still remain worse, while the statistics for
district court vacancies had remained worse until December 2019. Tillman, supra
note 38; see Russell Wheeler, Trump’s 1st State of the Union: Is He Really Reshaping
the Federal Judiciary?, BROOKINGS INST. (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/
blog/fixgov/2018/01/25/trumps-1st-state-of-the-union-is-he-really-reshaping-the-federal-judiciary/. See March 2020, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/2020/03/emergencies (last updated
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The descriptive assessment of the nomination and confirmation
processes reveals the ways in which the ideas employed by President
Trump and the Republican Senate majority have caused numerous deleterious ramifications for the judiciary, litigants, counsel and ultimately for the branches of the federal government and society. A
valuable measure of these ramifications is the list of present federal
court openings: one appellate court and seventy-three district court vacancies, forty-five involving emergencies; more district court vacancies and judicial emergencies in jurisdictions represented by
Democrats; and a troubling dearth of minority confirmees.84 At the
time of President Trump’s inauguration, there were 103 vacancies—
forty-two constituting emergencies—and the statistics had grown
worse until late 2019 even while currently-serving active judges’ predisposition to leave active status by retiring or assuming senior status
has putatively been slowing.85
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The phenomena recounted in the paragraph above impose detrimental effects. The statistics increase pressures on current district
court jurists—who are the only judges many federal court litigants
encounter—to swiftly, inexpensively and equitably resolve civil and
criminal suits and correspondingly on parties and numbers of Democratic lawmakers in jurisdictions that experience openings.86 Triallevel jurists comprise the justice system’s workhorses, because they
finally decide most civil lawsuits and criminal filings realize precedence under the Speedy Trial Act.87 Moreover, numerous protracted
unfilled slots undermine minority party home state politicians, who
could receive blame for the lengthy vacancies, and deprive the electorate and litigants of court judicial resources which they need and senators of patronage.
Salient parameters—especially the substantial numbers of district
court openings and judicial emergencies and the comparatively few
minority appointees—accentuate the critical necessity to place more
judges who are diverse in empty seats. White House neglect of minority representation has problematic effects. The federal courts should
be an essential locus for justice, but currently people of color, especially African Americans, Latino/as and Native Americans, are overrepresented as defendants in the criminal justice system and
underrepresented within the judiciary. This limited attention to the improvement of diversity is a lost opportunity for enhancing the quality
of justice which federal courts deliver and myriad litigants need.
Greater minority representation affords significant benefits.
Many persons of color, women and LGBTQ jurists supply “outsider”
42218-nyl_22-2 Sheet No. 68 Side B
05/20/2020 13:21:22

Mar. 24, 2020). Compare Judicial Vacancies, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/
judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies (last updated Mar. 24, 2020), with Judicial
Emergencies for February 2017, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/2017/02/emergencies (last updated
Feb. 1, 2017).
86. FED. R. CIV. P. 1; see Patrick Johnston, Problems in Raising Prayers to the
Level of Rule: The Example of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1, 75 B. U. L. REV.
1325 (1995) (suggesting that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1’s admonition that the
civil rules be “construed, administered, and employed to secure the just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding” may be aspirational, given
the pressures that vacancies and substantial dockets impose on district judges).
87. Kevin Diaz, Senate Approves Federal Judge—Growing Backlog Eased Slightly
in Unanimous Vote, HOUS. CHRON., Apr. 14, 2015, at B1; Joe Palazzolo, In Federal
Courts, The Civil Cases Pile Up, WALL STREET J. (Apr. 6, 2015, 2:09 PM), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/in-federal-courts-civil-cases-pile-up-1428343746; see Gary
Fields & John R. Emshwiller, As Criminal Laws Proliferate, More Are Ensnared,
WALL STREET J. (July 23, 2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405274870
3749504576172714184601654.
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views88 and different, constructive perspectives about numbers of crucial issues regarding abortion, criminal procedure and other daunting
questions, which federal judges treat.89 The presence of these judges
in the courtroom would limit pre-existing ethnic, gender and sexual
orientation prejudices that otherwise undermine justice.90 Judges, who
mirror the U.S. in diversity and perspective, would also increase citizen respect for the justice system by showing that ample people of
color, women and LGBTQ individuals serve professionally as jurists,
some of whom could better appreciate conditions which prompt numerous minorities to appear in federal court.91
Specific reasons for not addressing diversity, which may have
formerly possessed a semblance of plausibility, are unpersuasive today. For instance, the many accomplished conservative LGBTQ individuals, people of color and women—encompassing a number of
Trump judicial confirmees and nominees—dynamically rebut the condescending notions that appointing copious LGBTQ, minority and female nominees will erode merit because the pool is very small or the
nation lacks sufficient conservative aspirants.92 LGBTQ individuals,
people of color and women confirmed thus far demonstrate that
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88. See Theresa Beiner, The Elusive (but Worthwhile) Quest for a Diverse Bench in
the New Millennium, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 597, 610–17 (2003); John McCain &
Jeff Flake, Federal Judge Diane Humetewa, 40 HUMAN RIGHTS 22 (2015).
89. See Jennifer Peresie, Note, Female Judges Matter: Gender and Decisionmaking
in the Federal Appellate Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1759, 1765 (2005) (“Two other studies provided some evidence that the presence of female judges on federal appellate
panels affected case outcomes.”). But see Stephen Choi et al., Judging Women, 8 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 504, 526 (2011) (detecting little difference in decisionmaking by female federal judges).
90. See, e.g., GREGORY B. WALTERS, OFFICE OF THE CIRCUIT EXECUTIVE, NINTH
CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON RACIAL, RELIGIOUS & ETHNIC FAIRNESS: FINAL REPORT
(1997); FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS
STUDY COMMITTEE 169 (1990).
91. See Sylvia Lazos, Only Skin Deep?: The Cost of Partisan Politics on the Diversity of the Federal Bench, 83 IND. L. J. 1423, 1442 (2008) (“A representative judiciary
provides important symbolic and political meaning, has more legitimacy, demonstrates to the American public that the system is equitable and free of discrimination,
and is better able to achieve its goals of fairness and justice.”).
92. Instructive examples of Trump confirmees are Rowland, Thapar, Ho, Nalbandian, Park, Bumatay, Lagoa, Gren Scholer, Otake, Moorer, Rodriguez, Arias-Marxuach, Smith and Molloy. Tobias, Trump’s War on Diversity, supra note 43; see supra
notes 45–46 and accompanying text. Trump nominated and confirmed many other
accomplished, conservative women, encompassing Seventh Circuit Judge Amy Coney
Barrett and Sixth Circuit Judge Joan Larsen. See Press Release, White House, Nine
Nominations Sent to the Senate Today (May 8, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
presidential-actions/nine-nominations-sent-senate-today-2/; 163 CONG. REC. S6908
(daily ed. Oct. 31, 2017) (Barrett); 163 CONG. REC. S6944 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 2017)
(Larsen).
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93. Executive Business Meeting Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong.
(Mar. 7, 2019), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/03/07/2019/executive-business-meeting [hereinafter Mar. 7, 2019 Committee Meeting]; see Tonja Jacobi &
Matthew Sag, The New Oral Argument: Justices As Advocates, 94 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1161, 1195 (2019) (observing how oral argument at the Supreme Court has
changed in response to increased “partisan polarization in the political branches and
society at large.”); Orrin Hatch, Protect the Senate’s Important “Advice and Consent”
Role, THE HILL (Apr. 11, 2014, 8:00 AM), https://thehill.com/opinion/op-ed/203226protect-the-senates-important-advice-and-consent-role. This could even undercut public trust in judges’ decisions. PEOPLE FOR THE AMERICAN WAY, Confirmed Judges,
Confirmed Fears (2019); Rebecca Ruiz et al., Trump Stamps G.O.P. Imprint on the
Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2020, at A1. Appointees’ comparatively brief service
complicates discerning how Trump confirmees affect judicial decisionmaking, collegiality and competence.
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Trump has readily available plentiful strong candidates who deftly afford conservative perspectives and merit. The White House need only
capitalize on this salient potential.
Some of the administration’s actions which presidential discharge
of constitutional responsibilities to nominate and confirm accomplished jurists, particularly in the district courts, include: (1) canvassing home state elected officials’ submissions for nominees, (2) de
minimis transparency and rigor with home state politicians, (3) exclusion of ABA investigations, evaluations and ratings, (4) dependence
on truncated or inefficacious mechanisms and (5) proclivity for
stressing rapid confirmation of young, conservative appellate court
judges. The Republican Senate majority’s propensity to rapidly appoint numbers of similar judges—particularly through modifying appeals court blue slips, eschewing or cabining other valuable
procedures, namely searching inquiries during panel hearings, and
rubberstamping White House choices—undermines senators’ meaningful fulfillment of the constitutional duties to advise and consent.
The excessive number and prolonged nature of openings, specifically for district courts, might inflict enormous pressure on jurists and
stall lawsuit disposition, impeding federal bench endeavors to realize
its prominent responsibility to swiftly, economically and fairly resolve
cases. When the appellate courts, and especially the trial courts, lack
sufficient judicial resources for protracted times, this situation can impose ample corrosive effects. Incessant, explicit overemphasis on ideology when approving appellate court and district court jurists means
that the tribunals could actually resemble the political branches.
Judges who secure confirmation through overtly partisan and supremely politicized selection practices correspondingly seem extremely partisan and staunchly political, which may undercut public
confidence in the bench.93
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The loss and erosion of important traditions, especially White
House consultation of home state politicians and court of appeals blue
slips, can make the institutions of the presidency, the Senate and even
the judiciary appear to be in critical decline, as those customs are essentially the “glue” that binds the institutions.94 Finally, the complications assessed could erode public regard for, and trust in, all three
branches of American democracy.
In sum, President Trump has enjoyed considerable success in
nominating appeals court and district court prospects, while his administration set the record for confirming appellate court nominees,
many of whom are very conservative, young and preeminent. Nonetheless, the White House terminated, modified or downplayed constructive alternatives which have recently fostered very capable
jurists’ nominations and confirmations. The country and the tribunals
presently confront seventy-three district court vacancies, forty-five of
which implicate emergencies; district court openings were higher than
at Trump’s inauguration until December and judicial emergencies remain somewhat larger now. The concluding section of this article,
therefore, analyzes reforms which can enhance trial level
appointments.
IV.
SUGGESTIONS

FOR THE

FUTURE

A. Short-Term Suggestions

94. See 163 CONG. REC. S8042 (statement of Sen. Durbin); 163 CONG. REC.
S8022–24 (statement of Sen. Leahy); Ruger, supra note 32.

05/20/2020 13:21:22

The Trump Administration may capitalize on a number of effective long-standing remedies. The Trump White House already employs some of them. One is elevating accomplished, centrist
magistrate judges whom the Article III jurists serving in the ninetyfour district courts appoint for eight-year terms. That measure is practical and efficient, because the nominees have compiled accessible,
comprehensive records and offer substantial, distinguished relevant
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As the review of the confirmation and nomination processes’
modern situation demonstrates, certain ideas need remediation and
others could warrant amelioration, even while a few concepts used
have performed rather well. Accordingly, this section provides both
short-term and permanent constructs and several dramatic techniques,
which might help rectify the district court vacancy crisis by improving
the nomination and confirmation procedures.
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expertise.95 The elevation of Judges Rowland and Moorer to district
courts exemplify this approach.96
A related pragmatic strategy would be naming once again a few
of the twenty competent, moderate and conservative Obama district
court nominees who acquired committee reports without dissent yet
lacked Senate confirmation ballots.97 This avenue will promote faster
confirmation, because many renamed nominees must only secure
panel and floor votes.98 Trump has now deployed renomination with
fifteen Obama designees, most of whom were confirmed; he can improve minority representation and fill numerous protracted district
court openings by re-nominating other candidates, including Inga
Bernstein, Julien Neals and Florence Pan.99
The President also might contemplate implementing, emphasizing, reviving or improving numbers of effective judicial selection activities that he ignores or deemphasizes. One would be meticulously
consulting home state politicians about nominees, which constitutes a
major reason for the blue slip policy.100 Assertive consultation of
lawmakers, especially those senators who depend on accomplished selection commissions to propose superb individuals, expedites nominations and confirmations. A useful instance was marshaling the
nomination of three excellent, mainstream Northern District of Illinois
prospects—Rowland, Pacold and Steven Seeger—whom both Demo-
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95. 28 U.S.C. § 631 (2012). For elevating to federal appellate courts district court
judges whom the chamber has already confirmed, see Elisha Savchak et al., Taking It
To the Next Level: The Elevation of District Judges To the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 50
AM. J. POL. SCI. 478 (2006); Carl Tobias, Curing the Federal Court Vacancy Crisis,
53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 883, 910 (2018) (same regarding Trump, Obama and Bush
elevations); Carl Tobias, Combating the Ninth Circuit Judicial Vacancy Crisis, 73
WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 688, 715–18 (2017) (same regarding possible Trump
Ninth Circuit elevations).
96. See sources cited supra notes 34, 46; infra note 109.
97. The nominees were not confirmed in 2016, because the Republican Senate majority refused to conduct confirmation votes. Carl Tobias, Recalibrating Judicial Renominations in the Trump Administration, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 9, 18–19
(2017).
98. Most home state senators will return blue slips, as they did return them earlier
when the individuals were unsuccessful district nominees. See id. For those nominees
who need another hearing, their prior panel, FBI and ABA reviews should only require updating.
99. Examples of others whom Trump confirmed are Judges David Nye, Scott Palk,
Donald Coggins, Counts and Gren Scholer. Tobias, supra note 32, at 21–22; see id.
(recounting twenty-eight other Obama 2016 nominees, including Gujarati, who lacked
committee approval, whom Trump might renominate); Judicial Confirmations for December 2018, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/2018/12/confirmations (last updated Dec. 1, 2018).
100. See supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text.
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cratic senators powerfully supported and the Judiciary panel swiftly
processed.101 Therefore, the maximum effective consultation will not
invariably yield the strongest Republican or Democratic preferences
but may speed nominations and might resolve disputes that could
erode the process and interparty cooperation.102
The administration should concomitantly reconsider the mistaken
decision to prioritize young, conservative appellate court judges’ confirmation, which is the primary reason for the seventy-three district
court vacancies, forty-five of which constitute judicial emergencies,
and instead seriously consider numerous practices that will sharply
reduce the district court openings. For example, the President’s selection team may apply a regime which concentrates on the needs of all
courts. One valuable approach might be prioritizing nominations that
would relieve the forty-five judicial emergencies.103 The White House
can emphasize the many district court vacancies and the tribunals with
relatively large percentages of openings and rather significant numbers of judges, including districts across California and New York.104
Stressing most California and New York district courts—as well as
Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey and Washington tribunals—will
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101. They received a promptly scheduled, smooth panel hearing and vote. Press Release, White House, President Donald J. Trump Announces Fifteenth Wave of Judicial
Nominees, Fourteenth Wave of United States Attorney Nominees, and Ninth Wave of
United States Marshal Nominees (June 7, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/president-donald-j-trump-announces-fifteenth-wave-judicial-nominees-fourteenth-wave-united-states-attorney-nominees-ninth-wave-united-statesmarshal-nominees/; Nominations: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
115th Cong. (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/08/22/2018/
nominations (White House Counsel carefully consulted senators and Grassley quickly
set hearing) (statements of Sens. Durbin and Grassley); Executive Business Meeting
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (Oct. 11, 2018), https://
www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/10/11/2018/executive-business-meeting (panel
approvals); 165 CONG. REC. S5228, 5,230 (daily ed. July 31, 2019) (confirming Rowland and Pacold); 165 CONG. REC. S5434 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 2019) (confirming Seeger). But see sources cited supra note 42 (Trump only renamed the three Northern
District of Illinois nominees, seven New York district nominees and four Obama
nominees whom Trump had renamed on April 8 but only sent to the Senate on May
21, even though he had renamed fifty-five other nominees whose nominations expired
on January 2, 2019 during that month).
102. See supra notes 31–32, 49 and accompanying text (discussing disputes between
the Oregon and Wisconsin senators and the White House over nominees for those
states); Kaplan, supra note 30 (discussing similar disputes between the Ohio and
Washington senators and the White House over nominees for those states).
103. See supra notes 39–42, 72, 84–85.
104. See supra notes 39–42, 74, 84–85. California presently experiences seventeen
district court vacancies, all of which comprise judicial emergencies; New York currently experiences seven district court vacancies, most of which are judicial
emergencies.
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correspondingly address the lack of nominees from jurisdictions represented by Democrats.105 The chief executive might accord home state
officers expanded responsibility for discovering, recruiting, canvassing and proffering numbers of superb candidates whom the President
concomitantly nominates.106
The White House should reassess its misguided decision to exclude the American Bar Association from official responsibility for
delivering nominee investigations with rankings. Presidents since the
1950s, excepting George W. Bush and Trump, have directly invoked
the ABA’s considerable experience, mammoth network of impressive
examiners and cautious, informative ratings.107 Deployment of ABA
evaluations and rankings during candidate pre-nomination inquiries
may concomitantly limit the embarrassment suffered by quite a few
Trump aspirants who garner not qualified ratings.108 The ultimate confirmation of multiple people who drew this ranking suggests that the
ABA does helpfully alert participants in the selection process to ostensible concerns about nominees.109 Should the President insist on eschewing a formal bar association role, White House Counsel might at
least allow certain designees and nominees to coordinate with the

42218-nyl_22-2 Sheet No. 71 Side B
05/20/2020 13:21:22

105. Illinois presently experiences four district court vacancies and Washington currently encounters five district, all of which are emergencies, Illinois encounters five,
while New Jersey experiences six openings, all of which are judicial emergencies and
for which Trump has yet to nominate a single candidate. See supra notes 42, 74, 84.
Sparsely populated jurisdictions, including Alaska, Idaho, Montana and Nebraska,
which have few authorized judgeships, also merit emphasis, as one vacancy can be a
large percentage. See 28 U.S.C. § 133 (2012).
106. The President has seemingly deferred to numerous home state senators, particularly on district vacancies. See supra notes 36–38 and accompanying text.
107. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. But see supra note 34.
108. See supra note 38. The chief executive may decline to nominate the candidate
or the candidate might decide to withdraw privately.
109. See supra note 34. When the ABA rated Goodwin and Teeter not qualified,
chief judges where each now maintain chambers expressed support. See Nominations:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (Dec. 20, 2017), https://
www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/12/13/2017/nominations (statement of Charles
Barnes Goodwin, nominee); Executive Business Meeting Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 115th Cong. (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/
01/18/2018/executive-business-meeting (statement of Holly Lou Teeter, nominee);
supra note 34 (Goodwin & Teeter confirmations); see Peter Hancock, Senate Panel
Advances Johnson County Attorney for Federal Judgeship in Kansas, LAWRENCE J.WORLD (Nov. 9, 2017, 12:46 PM), https://www2.ljworld.com/news/2017/nov/09/senate-panel-advances-teeter-federal-judgeship-kan/; Justin Wingerter, Oklahoma City
Federal Judge Defends His Work Ethic Before Senate Committee, OKLAHOMAN (Dec.
13, 2017), https://oklahoman.com/article/5575779/oklahoma-city-federal-judge-defends-his-work-ethic-before-senate-committee. But see supra notes 61, 83 and accompanying text (Republican Senate majority lockstep voting in Judiciary Committee and
on the floor and rubberstamping of conservative, young nominees may also explain
ultimate confirmation).
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110. See supra note 35 (first Counsel intimating that nominees not coordinate with
the ABA); see supra note 34 (Sen. Lee arguing that White House should not allow
nominees to cooperate with the ABA because it is a partisan political group which
ABA’s assignment of a not qualified rating to a strong Ninth Circuit nominee
illustrates).
111. See supra notes 88–91 and accompanying text.
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ABA when the organization undertakes comprehensive investigations
of candidates and preparation of ratings.110
Moreover, the chief executive must implement actions that will
expand federal court diversity, because greater minority representation
furnishes numerous benefits.111 The White House should prioritize diversity while conveying to selection participants and citizens that
Trump believes improving minority representation has abundant significance. The White House Counsel ought to lead this effort by actively communicating the view that a potential nominee’s diversity is
as important a priority as his or her conservatism. The appropriate
focus of that importuning will be the Counsel Office, the Justice Department, the Judiciary Committee and lawmakers from states which
experience unoccupied posts.
The White House Counsel should articulate thorough recommendations which augment diversity. For instance, Counsel Office employees and others who collaborate on appointments need to include
minority staff in decision-making while also committing sufficient resources to provide salutary discharge of the responsibility for enhancing diversity. Individuals and entities participating in the nomination
process must identify, examine and send numerous talented people of
color, women and LGBTQ selections by contacting individuals, legislators and diverse interest groups, including the Federalist Society,
that know of accomplished possibilities. The White House Counsel
should persuade lawmakers from states with vacancies to seek out,
evaluate and propose conservative nominees. The Counsel Office next
must survey, interview and proffer these choices, asking that Trump
seriously evaluate naming the individuals. The President may lead by
example with the persons’ concomitant nominations, urging senators
to productively support and promptly canvass them.
The White House and the Senate must comprehensively explore
plenty of short-term solutions that might improve the processes for
nominating and confirming jurists. Trump may want to assiduously
consult home state officers and reimplement ABA participation from
both of which numerous White Houses, Senates, judges as well as the
Democratic and Republican political parties have derived essential
benefits. Senators might revitalize prominent constructive procedures,
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notably honoring blue slips for appellate courts and for district courts,
thorough, rigorous hearings and floor debates and concepts which
have successfully promoted expanded minority judicial representation.
B. Longer-Term Suggestions

05/20/2020 13:21:22

112. Tobias, supra note 21, at 1107; see sources cited supra notes 61–62, 68; John
Gramlich, Federal Judicial Picks Have Become More Contentious, and Trump’s Are
No Exception, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/
fact-tank/2018/03/07/federal-judicial-picks-have-become-more-contentious-andtrumps-are-no-exception/.
113. For longer-term concepts that may address the confirmation wars, see Michael
Shenkman, Decoupling District from Circuit Judge Nominations: A Proposal to Put
Trial Bench Confirmations on Track, 65 ARK. L. REV. 217, 298–311 (2012); Tobias,
supra note 25, at 2255–65.
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The review undertaken demonstrates that the confirmation wars
ahead of Trump’s inauguration have persisted since his election, illuminated by the Democrats’ rare concurrence on confirmation votes
and the Republicans’ triggering of the nuclear option for Supreme
Court and district court nominees.112 Many parameters show it is past
time to consider endeavors which permanently improve flagging judicial appointments strictures: the minuscule number of confirmations
throughout President Obama’s last half term, the selection process’
downward spiral manifested by unproductive paybacks and systematic
politicization that culminated with the Republican Senate majority’s
refusal to consider Judge Merrick Garland, the strikingly limited cooperation between the Republican and Democratic parties so early in
Trump’s presidency and the seemingly diminished prospects for rectifying the complications. The Trump Administration’s corresponding
deletion, alteration or underemphasis of relatively effective selection
concepts substantially accentuates the practices’ steady decline.
2020 is a promising season to effectuate longer-term reforms. Because 2020 is an election year—and neither political party can be sure
who will capture the White House and the Senate in November and
capitalize on the possible modifications—this year will be replete with
uncertainties and opportunities for compromise and concomitant potential agreement on reforms. As a result, 2020 is a propitious time to
adopt several longer-term constructs when the parties should favor
permanent solutions, while the President and the Senate must honor
fundamental constitutional appointments duties with meaningful collaboration that prescribes effective remedies.113 The best time for acting is now, before the 2020 elections, as lack of clarity about the
elections’ outcomes presents more incentives for Republicans and
Democrats to concur.
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President Trump and lawmakers can agree to drastically change
the existing system through invocation of a bipartisan judiciary that
would enable the party without administration control to submit a percentage of nominees.114 Senators from multiple jurisdictions have implemented similar efforts in the past. Since the 1970s, New York’s
senators have agreed to allow the senator whose party lacked the executive to stipulate one in a few district picks.115 Pennsylvania offers a
modern example. Senators Casey (D) and Pat Toomey (R) use bipartisan selection panels, which have canvassed and recommended individuals since 2011,116 with the lawmaker whose party does not hold the
White House sending one in four trial-level nominees.117 Senators
from other states have employed similar schemes.118
The selection procedures used by senators in certain states are a
good starting point from which senators from states with vacancies
and the President should negotiate a framework which governs judicial selection across the board.119 The percentages of selections submitted by the party not in the White House, the number of candidates
that it could muster for every vacancy, and whether prospects ought to
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114. Michael Gerhardt, Judicial Selection as War, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 667, 688
(2003); Carl Tobias, Fixing the Federal Judicial Selection Process, 65 EMORY L. J.
ONLINE 2051, 2056 (2016).
115. The New York senators first allowed one of four and most recently permitted
one of three under Senators Alfonse D’Amato (R) and Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D).
143 CONG. REC. S2538 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997) (statement of Sen. Biden); see Stephan Kline, The Topsy-Turvy World of Judicial Confirmations in the Era of Hatch
and Lott, 103 DICK. L. REV. 247, 298–99 (1999).
116. Press Release, Sen. Pat Toomey, Senators Casey and Toomey Continue Bipartisan Agreement on District Court Vacancies (Mar. 10, 2017), https://
www.toomey.senate.gov/?p=news&id=1896.; P. J. D’Annunzio, Pa. Senators Pledge
Continued Cooperation on Judges, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Mar. 17, 2017), https://
www.law.com/thelegalintelligencer/almID/1202781471929/Pa-Senators-Pledge-Con
tinued-Cooperation-on-Judicial-Picks/?mcode=1395262324557&curindex=1&back=
NLJ; S. Judiciary Comm., Hearing on Nominees, Oct. 16, 2019 (statement of Sen.
Toomey).
117. See sources cited supra note 114. Illinois employed an analogous regime when
the delegation was split, and Democratic Senators Durbin and Tammy Duckworth
retain the approach. Press Release, Sen. Dick Durbin, Durbin: White House Nominates Two to Fill Federal Judicial Vacancies in Northern District (Aug. 5, 2014),
https://www.durbin.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/durbin-white-house-nominates-two-to-fill-federal-judicial-vacancies-in-northern-district; see supra note 101
and accompanying text.
118. Tobias, supra note 95, at 916.
119. See sources cited supra note 114 (providing specific guidance for establishing a
bipartisan judiciary). But see 143 CONG. REC. S2538 (daily ed. March 19, 1997)
(statement of Sen. Biden) (expressing concern about a similar Republican proposal
during the Clinton Administration).
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be ranked should be essential components of an agreement.120 In split
delegations, pertinent considerations include whether the state’s Republican or Democrat parties or the state’s executive branch will initiate candidate rankings and how to navigate crucial differences
between the lawmakers and the President. Allowing the senators to
concur and forwarding one choice at a time until the White House
could agree can be helpful, because the ideas reflect contemporary
practice and constitutional phraseology.121
A related question would be what courts are eligible. For instance, a few tribunals, especially the U.S. District Court for the D.C.
District, can require omission, as the District of Columbia has no senators and Presidents conventionally lead this appointments system.122
Because court of appeals openings can arise infrequently while the
tribunals comprise a few states, the bipartisan judiciary may apply
well to courts of appeals that encompass numerous members.123 Nevertheless, perceptions that seating the jurists is very political, complicated and critical—as circuit rulings govern multiple jurisdictions and
espouse significantly more policy and concomitantly have greater impacts—suggest that appellate courts’ deletion would be appropriate.
Congress ought to combine the bipartisan judiciary with legislation that authorizes sixty-five new trial court, and only five court of
appeals, positions.124 This would implement U.S. Judicial Conference
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120. The regimes that senators currently apply suggest that opposition members can
suggest one in three or four district court nominees. Using 2020, in states with two
Democrats, they pick; in those with two GOP members, the senior Democratic officer
selects; and in states with split delegations, the Democrat picks. All legislators then
must work with the President.
121. See supra notes 16–18 (following similar procedures), infra note 128 (procedures honor the process that the Constitution envisions). The lawmakers also should
choose several picks and rank the selections proposed to enhance flexibility and expedite selection by obviating the need to restart the selection process when the President
and senators cannot reach agreement.
122. Tribunals with a bipartisan judiciary may be matters for negotiation or be left to
the party lacking the presidency. Small districts can merit exclusion, as they rarely
have openings. See supra note 105 (one vacancy can be a large percentage in a small
district).
123. Even the Ninth Circuit, the largest appellate court, experiences openings every
2 decades in Alaska, Hawaii, Idaho, and Montana. Congress requires that each circuit’s states must have at least one active member of the appellate court. 28 U.S.C.
§ 44(c) (2018); see Executive Business Meeting Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
115th Cong. (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/02/15/2018/
executive-business-meeting (statements of Sens. Crapo, Feinstein, & Leahy) (discussing a multi-state dispute over whether California or Idaho was entitled to a particular
Ninth Circuit seat, a controversy that illuminates the type of disputes that may complicate employing a bipartisan judiciary for circuits).
124. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS
26 (2019), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2019-03_proceedings_0.pdf;
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recommendations for the Senate and House, derived by the federal
courts’ policymaking arm from conservative estimates, which implicate work and caseloads that will best allocate the judicial resources
necessary to deliver litigants justice.125 These measures would become
effective over 2021, thereby affording neither party benefits when first
initiated while confining the ability to game the regime.126
Combining a bipartisan judiciary and seventy additional appellate
court and district court posts would offer many advantages. Bipartisan
courts and new judgeships can improve the process, while according
trial courts some desperately-needed judicial resources and both parties incentives to cooperate and confirm jurists, who provide diverse
expertise, ideology, ethnicity, gender, and sexual preference. Adoption
in 2020, with implementation coming during 2021, will reduce both
parties’ opportunities to derive multiple unfair benefits, even though
authorizing and implementing a bipartisan judiciary would necessitate
considerable care. For example, Joe Biden, when he was serving as a
Delaware senator, criticized a related proposal because it was untraditional and the Constitution states that the President nominates, and
with Senate advice and consent appoints, jurists.127 However, Biden’s
proposition similarly describes the unprecedented politicized gridlock
which the selection process has manifested since 2009, while a bipartisan judiciary which respects the Constitution might be prescribed.128
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Tobias, supra note 62, at 140. If the selection process does not improve, more judgeships will not enhance the process or rectify the vacancy crisis.
125. JUDICIAL CONF. REPORT, supra note 124; see S. 1385, 113th Cong. § 1 (20132014), https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-bill/1385/text (most recent comprehensive judgeships legislation).
126. When the political parties concur before elections, it is more difficult for either
party to game the system. Presidential election years are more felicitous than midterm
election years, because the President can be on the ballot and may be more willing to
cooperate.
127. Senator Biden was referencing “trades” between Republican senators and President Clinton that the GOP members suggested. 143 CONG. REC. S2538 (daily ed. Mar.
19, 1997) (statement of Sen. Biden). Georgia Republican senators and Obama appeared to use trades when they were unable to agree on nominees for Georgia vacancies. Dan Malloy, The Delegation of Georgians in D.C., ATLANTA J.-CONST., July 20,
2014, at 14A; see sources cited supra note 32; infra notes 138–41; supra note 30
(McGahn’s analogous perspective on consultation).
128. The Constitution does not proscribe these ideas, on which Trump and Congress
may concur. The ideas might politicize selection more or deny political winners
spoils. However, they could enhance selection, the confirmation wars need to cease
and litigant and court needs should be paramount. For contrasting perspectives on
what “unprecedented” means in the judicial selection context, see Josh Chafetz, Unprecedented? Judicial Confirmation Battles and the Search for a Usable Past, 131
HARV. L. REV. 96, 103 (2017); Michael J. Gerhardt, Practice Makes Precedent, 131
HARV. L. REV. F. 32, 43–45 (2017).
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Effectuating this notion appears complex, but Congress can felicitously solve most dilemmas that might arise.129
Another possible long-term reform would be changing the filibuster that has been important to the confirmation wars. The device
traditionally safeguarded the minority party’s rights, yet various
abuses show that this construct deserves additional refinement.130 For
instance, filibusters could be selectively employed against nominees
who clearly lack the intelligence, ethics, temperament, diligence, or
independence to perform as exceptional federal jurists. This goal
would be secured through permitting filibusters only in “extraordinary
circumstances,” a rubric that was implemented somewhat successfully
in 2005, and comprehensively defining extraordinary circumstances.131 These activities may promote reinstitution of sixty votes
for cloture, a determination that would reverse the nuclear option’s
2013 detonation and perhaps spur better party collaboration.132
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129. Congress has addressed more complex issues, namely how to treat substantial,
increasingly complex dockets with limited resources, by authorizing new judgeships,
but the last comprehensive statute passed in 1990. See Federal Judgeship Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 201–206, 104 Stat. 5089, 5089–5104 (1990). The earlier
ideas address many issues that a bipartisan judiciary might create. For more specific
recommendations regarding bipartisan courts, see Tobias, supra note 114.
130. Filibuster abuse provoked the nuclear option’s explosion, which limited filibuster invocation by mandating a majority vote for cloture, while 2015-16 Republican
senators denial to Obama nominees of final votes was abusive, as might be Democratic senators 2017-18 virtually automatic denial of unanimous consent, which devoured thirty hours of floor debate time. See sources cited supra notes 21–22, 62, 68.
131. Text of Senate Compromise on Nominations of Judges, N.Y. TIMES (May 24,
2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/24/politics/text-of-senate-compromise-onnominations-of-judges.html; see Michael Gerhardt & Richard Painter, “Extraordinary
Circumstances”: The Legacy of the Gang of 14 and a Proposal for Judicial Nominations Reform, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 969, 970–72 (2012). A few senators said that
nominee ideological perspectives and the number of tribunal cases and judges were
not extraordinary circumstances in a controversy over D.C. Circuit vacancies. Executive Business Meeting Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (Mar. 7,
2019), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/03/07/2019/executive-businessmeeting; see Tobias, supra note 62, at 125–28 (analyzing disagreement among senators as to what constituted extraordinary circumstances).
132. Graham has suggested this proposition, but that it apply in 2021. Executive
Business Meeting Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (Feb. 7, 2019),
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/02/07/2019/executive-business-meeting.
Republicans hold the Senate, so the party might reject the alterations, but filibuster
change may be one aspect of a global solution, which also requires two hours of postcloture debate for district nominees. But see Everett & Levine, supra note 68 (Schumer offered two-hour debates on district nominees in return for honoring circuit slips,
but the GOP majority rejected this). The GOP will not retain the majority forever and
could agree to this trade. Tobias, supra note 62, at 140. An effective 2007-08 custom
was chamber votes on all strong, mainstream district nominees before recesses. Tobias, supra note 22, at 31; see sources cited supra note 65 (similar 2018 and 2019
notion). The Senate may also employ other conventions to reinstitute regular order.
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C. More Dramatic Reforms

05/20/2020 13:21:22

133. See sources cited supra note 68.
134. I rely in this paragraph and below on the ideas of Christopher Kang, who
spearheaded considerable Obama White House judicial selection. Jeremy Stahl,
Republicans Are Abolishing Judicial Appointments Norms Again, SLATE (Feb. 22,
2019), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/02/trump-judicial-appointments-mcconnell-democrats-chris-kang.html.
135. Kang finds that Democratic senators have been less assertive in championing
their preferred candidates with Trump than Republicans were with Obama. Id. (cooperating has not proved effective).
136. Id.; see sources cited supra notes 21–22, 52 (the Republican Senate majority
denied Supreme Court nominee Garland and four Obama circuit nominees any 2016
review and three appellate nominees final votes); supra note 132 (GOP rejection of
proposal similar to the suggestion in the text).
137. Stahl, supra note 134; Judicial Vacancies, U.S. CTS., https://
www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies (last updated Jan. 8, 2020)
(there is now one circuit vacancy and there may soon be none).
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Should the ideas assessed earlier prove unworkable, because the
Republican President and Senate majority staunchly persist in eviscerating meaningful Democratic involvement with selection, the latter
party can seriously evaluate, and contemplate implementing, relatively
dramatic actions. Continued presidential failure to meticulously consult home state politicians and chamber refusal to honor blue slips for
appeals court nominees exemplify GOP proclivity to subvert and dilute longstanding, effective Senate customs. A more recent threat
which Republicans activated was deployment of the nuclear option
that modified post-cloture debates respecting district court nominees
through acute reduction of the thirty hours currently available to two,
thus eroding a salient convention.133
One promising approach ironically derives from blue slips, even
though Republicans have directly undermined their power regarding
appellate court vacancies.134 Individual Democrats might retain blue
slips on nominees proposed for district court openings in their respective states, until the President submits nominees who could prove
more acceptable to the senators.135 The Democratic caucus also can
pledge to return no slips on administration candidates proffered for
home state district court vacancies pending Republican agreement to
honor court of appeals slips.136 The leverage derived from collective
action regarding the many empty district court posts combined with
the minuscule number of appellate court vacancies could persuade the
GOP to acquiesce on circuits.137
A solution related to the proposal that Democratic senators be
more assertive with Trump respecting district court openings is the
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policy of agreeing to “trades.”138 For example, the makeup of the California trial-level nominee package and multiple similar New York
appellate court and district court packages suggests that the President
and both sets of Democratic politicians recommended some nominees.139 More particularly, Senator Feinstein characterized the district
court nominees submitted as a relatively fair compromise, while
Trump apparently proffered most New York appeals court selections
and the politicians seemingly picked many district court nominees.140
The four senators appeared to be relatively pleased with most district
court nominees, and they returned all except one district court blue
slip.141 Nonetheless, “horsetrading” jurists might have a negative connotation. For instance, the critical nature of life-tenured appointments
could mean that they should not be the subject of deals like certain
executive appointments or legislation. Moreover, Trump only renominated in early April 2019 many New York district court prospects who
had secured hearings and committee reports in 2018, while he confirmed merely a single New York trial level nominee before December 2019 and the Senate has yet to confirm any California district
court nominee, even as the President has appointed four extremely
conservative Second and Ninth Circuit judges in New York and California respectively.142
Analogous problems can suffuse the idea of “boycotting” panel
hearings and committee votes or Senate debates and chamber ballots.
For example, minority party legislators were absent from a hearing
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138. See sources cited supra note 127; see also sources cited supra notes 135–37.
139. See sources cited supra note 42.
140. Press Release, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Feinstein, Harris on Ninth Circuit Nominees (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/press/dem/releases/
feinstein-harris-on-ninth-circuit-nominees. Two New York Second Circuit appointees
and four California Ninth Circuit appointees are extremely conservative and young,
and the other two New York confirmees are George W. Bush district appointees who
seem less conservative. Mar. 7, 2019 Committee Meeting, supra note 93 (using Judge
Sullivan as example of consultation working). The New York Eastern and Southern
District nominees as well as the California Central and Southern District nominees are
more centrist than the New York Second, and the California Ninth, Circuit nominees.
141. Press Release, White House, Eight Nominations and Three Withdrawals Sent to
the Senate (Sept. 19, 2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/eightnominations-three-withdrawals-sent-senate/. (concerning the withdrawal of Northern
District of New York nominee Thomas Marcelle purportedly because Sen. Gillibrand
did not return her blue slip); Robert Gavin & Mike Goodwin, Gillibrand Blocked
Judge’s Nomination to the Federal Bench, ALBANY TIMES UNION (Aug. 29, 2019),
https://www.timesunion.com/news/article/U-S-Attorney-in-Albany-picked-for-federal-14397720.php.
142. For horsetrading, see Tobias, supra note 29, at 2260 n.126; sources cited supra
note 127; see also sources cited supra note 42 (Trump delayed renomination). Thus,
trades should be reserved for desperate circumstances.
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which Grassley convened after the Senate had recessed in October
2018 for campaigning.143 The attempts of particular Democratic senators and their caucus to assemble workable compromises were not effective because individual Republican legislators and their caucus
appeared more concerned about capitalizing on the erosion of nearly
all chamber traditions.144 Therefore, although boycotting could illuminate and publicize the corrosive effects of the downward spiraling appointments process, which GOP Senate obstruction clearly propels,
the adverse impacts of boycotting can surpass their benefits and prove
counterproductive.145 Accordingly, boycotts should be a last resort.
CONCLUSION
President Trump and the Republican Senate majority have not
only continued but exacerbated the unproductive district court nominee selection and confirmation dynamics which propel the increasingly destructive judicial confirmation wars. Thus, the administration
must cooperate with both parties’ senators to end or ameliorate the
vacancy crisis, which has restricted initiatives of federal district courts
and judges to enhance case resolution, for the good of litigants, the
bench, the President, the Senate and the country.
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